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EU Visa Policy: A Bastion of Exclusion or Patron of Refugees – The Case 
of the Humanitarian Visa 
 
 
 
Mikko Viljami Hakkarainen 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Asylum seekers aspiring to find refuge in the territory of the European Union are faced 
with a myriad of barriers to entry that inhibit or even prevent legal entry into the Union. 
Among these barriers emerges EU visa policy effectively requiring nationals of all major 
refugee-producing countries to meet strict visa requirements to lawfully cross the external 
borders of the Union. As a result many attempt to reach the territory of the Member States 
irregularly and often in precarious fashion. The EU Visa Code (810/2009/EC) enables 
Member States to issue visas for humanitarian purposes despite the applicant not fulfilling 
the prescribed entry requirements under the Schengen acquis. The thesis expounds current 
visa practices in the Schengen framework and sheds light on the barriers to entry and the 
notion of the humanitarian visa. The employment of conscious and harmonised visa policy 
at Union level could facilitate the safe passage of asylum seekers into the European Union 
as one tool in the toolbox for lowering the migrant death toll.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Armed conflicts and other emergencies around the world produce mass movements of 
people in need of protection. Safe haven in the form of asylum is often the grail sought 
after. These displaced persons often resort to irregular methods of crossing the border of 
the state in which they will eventually apply for asylum in want of adequate legal means to 
do so. We have witnessed this all too frequently in the headlines of newspapers and reports 
about migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean in search for better lives only to find 
the expedition to be their last. Barriers to entry such as carrier sanctions, interceptions at 
sea and strict visa requirements all play their part in inhibiting asylum seekers from 
embarking on the endeavour of entering legally. Instead they frequently resort to 
undertaking perilous voyages. This all the while European Union Member States are bound 
by the collective responsibility of states to protect refugees. The figures offer a rather dire 
image of the present situation. The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) reported on 
World Refugee Day1 2014 that the number of forcedly displaced persons globally has 
surpassed 50 million.2 This figure comprises refugees, asylum seekers and internally 
displaced persons alike.  
 
The responsibility of states to protect refugees is multi-layered and fragmented. Various 
legal instruments are part and parcel of this entirety. Coming from many fronts, this 
responsibility is imposed on states pursuant to international human rights law, international 
refugee law and regional human rights instruments coupled with directly applicable 
European Union law commanding adherence to these sources of norms. The proliferation 
of instruments addressing the rights of the vulnerable refugees and the obligations of the 
participating states on the one hand and the often-perceived inactivity of states on 
humanitarian issues on the other speak to the sensitive nature of the topic. Entry into the 
territory of the Union whether for certain third country national tourists or asylum seekers 
is dependent upon having an entry permit, a visa. The requirement of having to be in 
possession of a visa for the purpose of entry into the Union is one of the many barriers to 
entry. 
                                                         
1 A UNHCR organised event held every June 20 to raise awareness on refugee-related matters. 
2 ‘World Refugee Day: Global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War II era’, 
UNHCR News Stories, June 20, 2014, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html> (accessed June 
24 2014).  
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Visa policy in the EU has been harmonised to an impressive extent considering the highly 
politicised character of migration-related matters. Visa requirements are imposed on third 
countries for a variety of reasons of which the impediment of illegal immigration is the 
most commonly spoken. Currently, all major refugee-producing countries are required to 
be in possession of a visa to enter the area of the Member States. The legal framework on 
visa policy is a rigid one. The requirements to be met in order for the third country national 
to be issued a visa, especially from certain third countries, are sometimes difficult to meet 
even for a regular traveller. The chances of success in this regard for a forcedly displaced 
person are scant. However, the provision in the EU Visa Code (810/2009/EC) regarding 
the issuance of a visa with limited territorial validity for humanitarian grounds or because 
of international obligations may give hope yet. The employment of conscious and 
considered visa policy could pave the way for the implementation of a true responsibility 
to protect those fleeing persecution, a responsibility already envisaged under many human 
rights tools. The common Schengen visa, the issuance of which is practically dependent 
upon agreement by all Member States, entitles its holder to travel freely within all 
Schengen Member States. The visa with limited territorial validity, or humanitarian visa, 
for the most part, entitles its holder to travel only to the issuing Member State. The issue of 
the humanitarian visa is as topical as ever, as conflicts in the outskirts of Europe ensue, the 
number of displaced persons is at an all-time high since the end of World War II and 
migrant death tolls due to attempts at reaching the Union irregularly have reached a 
pinnacle. 
 
This thesis examines the potential and current role of EU visa policy in facilitating the safe 
passage of asylum seekers and refugees into the territory of the Member States. More 
specifically, the emphasis is on Schengen Member States3 as they have committed to a 
common visa policy in the EU framework4. The study also considers some specific 
changes that current legislation ought to undergo in order to enable Member States to 
better live up to their international obligations vis-à-vis those in imminent peril. Both 
opportunities as well as challenges to the conclusions and propositions presented in the 
ensuing text are also contemplated. The research concentrates on the potential of the 
enabling legislation, preparatory documentation, political statements, various reports and                                                         
3 Current Schengen Member States are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (July 2014).  
4 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 77(2). 
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statistics whether they support the arguments put forward or challenge them. Ministry 
officials, European Commission representatives and consular staff, too, have been 
interviewed for this purpose.  
 
The methodology I adopted for the analysis of the relevant law comprises both a black-
letter analytical approach as well as a more sociological method. I began the research by 
reading and analysing relevant legal instruments as part of a system of inter-related rules 
regulating visa policy and asylum. Following the initial analysis, I composed 
questionnaires that were later sent to the Commission, foreign ministries of Schengen 
Member States and various embassies and consulates situated in or accredited to third 
countries that produce large numbers of asylum seekers. Additionally, the annual visa 
statistics compiled by the Commission presented material for the analysis of current state 
practices. The relationship between EU visa policy and refugee protection has not to this 
day been studied in depth. The link between migration and security has of course been 
researched, but the provisions of the fairly new Visa Code enabling the issuance of visas 
for humanitarian reasons or because of international obligations and its potential to 
facilitate the safe passage of bona fide asylum seekers remains to my knowledge by and 
large unexplored. Due to the relative novelty of the research question and enabling 
legislation, little case law on the matter exist.  
 
The present thesis is organised in seven separate chapters. The various legal tools that bind 
Schengen Member States regarding refugee protection are outlined in chapter 2 Legal 
Framework of the Responsibility to Protect Refugees. The limited access to the territory of 
the Member States due to barriers to entry as well as strict visa requirements are dealt with 
in chapter 3 Barriers to Entry, where various individual restrictive properties of visa policy 
are also examined. Chapter 4 sketches the Role of EU Visa Policy as others and I have 
envisaged it and whether it currently protects or exposes refugees to harm. Chapter 5 
considers the crux of this research, i.e. the potential of Visas with Limited Territorial 
Validity as well as the legal framework, including an analysis of the proposal text and the 
adopted text of the enabling article. Also statistics and the one piece of relevant case law 
are discussed in this chapter. The Opportunities, Challenges and Recommendations 
regarding humanitarian visas are reflected on in chapter 6. Concluding Remarks are 
presented in chapter 7.  
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2. Legal Framework of the Responsibility to Protect Refugees 
 
This chapter outlines briefly the historical background of the institutions dealing with 
refugee matters and goes into more recent developments with regard to the collective 
responsibility of states to protect refugees.  
 
 
2.1 The Principle of Non-Refoulement and Access to Asylum 
 
The recognition by states of a collective responsibility to protect refugees can be traced 
back to the end of the First World War and finally culminating in the more detailed 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refuges and in its 1967 Protocol. The first known 
inceptions of the concept of ‘refugee’ in the international legal context took place already 
in the 19th century. It was not, however, until the end of the First World War that states 
actually took to instrumentalize the protection of those fleeing persecution as a proper legal 
notion.5 The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees crystallised 
the principle of ‘restricted expulsion’6, albeit that treaty was not at the time widely 
applicable due to measly membership. Various international commissions and offices 
concentrating on refugee matters were established and subsequently wound up or replaced 
between 1920 and 1950.7  After the Second World War the United Nations General 
Assembly established the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees8, which is 
operational to this day. Similarly, in the aftermath of the war, came to existence the 
principal treaty on refugee protection – The1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. During the same decade came the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms9, indirectly addressing the right to asylum. 
Further down the road the European Union began to bestow upon asylum seekers various 
rights.                                                         
5 A. Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), pp. 10-11.  
6 Restricted expulsion refers to the notion that Contracting Parties were not to remove from the territory or 
refuse entry into the territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the 
frontier, refugees who have been authorised to reside there. Only measures dictated by reasons of national 
security or public interest were justified.  
7 E.g. The Office of the International Commissioner for Refugees; International Nansen Office for Refugees; 
High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany; Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. 
8 Charter of the United Nations, Article 22.  
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all EU Member 
States are party as are the EU institutions.   
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2.1.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention and International Law 
 
The starting point for the operation of the 1951 Refugee Convention is that refugees be 
outside the territory of their own country and that their own state is incapable of protecting 
them10. The treaty introduced the requirement that the fear of persecution be grounded on 
one of the five grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion and membership of a 
particular social group11. Fulfilment of these conditions would in theory determine the 
applicant a refugee. The term ‘refugee’ thus denotes recognition by a state of the particular 
status attached to the person12. Before a determination on the person’s status is made, that 
person is termed ‘asylum seeker’. The Institute of International Law defined the concept of 
‘asylum’ as ‘…the protection which a State grants on its territory or in some other place 
under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to seek it.’13 It should, 
however, be noted that international law merely recognises the right to seek and enjoy 
asylum from persecution14 whilst the granting of asylum is left for the discretion of 
individual states. The most recent attempt at regulating asylum at the international level 
was the 1977 UN Conference on Territorial Asylum, which proved to be a failure. 
Furthermore, the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ inevitably links the two concepts together 
by virtue of rendering it against international law to turn away an alien to a third country 
where there is a well-founded fear of persecution.15  
 
Under the Refugee Convention no Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion16. Reservations on the provision are not allowed. The convention 
                                                        
10 P. Weis, ‘Legal Aspects of the 1951 Geneva Convention’, 30 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1953), 478-489 at 480.  
11 Refugee Convention, Art. 1A(2).  
12 The Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders defines ‘asylum seeker’ as ‘any alien who has lodged an 
application for asylum within the meaning of this Convention and in respect of which a final decision has not 
yet been taken.’ 
13 Institute of International Law, Bath Session, Annuaire 1 (1950), Article 1.  
14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 
Article 14.  
15 See e.g. G. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 357.  
16 Refugee Convention, Art. 33.  
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provides for an extremely limited exception17 to this the application of which is revealed 
by the travaux préparatoires as very narrow indeed.18  
 
The Final Act of the 1951 Refugee Convention stated that Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention on the principle of non-refoulement was an expression of a generally accepted 
principle. It certainly is now widely seen as a principle of customary international law also 
due to, but not limited to the fact that there are some 150 states bound by the convention 
obligation.19 The principle has since been recognised and affirmed in international 
declarations, conventions and in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions. 
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention is not the only instrument granting protection to refugees. 
The obligation of non-refoulement has been developed in the realm of international human 
rights law, too. There it plays the role of a preventive approach to the protection of human 
rights.20 There exist a wide array of treaties to this effect such as the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and of course the European Convention on 
Human Rights.   
 
 
2.1.2 The European Convention on Human Rights  
While the regional human rights convention does not itself expressly provide for a right to 
seek asylum, nor does it expressly incorporate the principle of non-refoulement, Article 3 
prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment. Indirectly, 
therefore, a state could be in violation of the article where a citizen of a third country 
would be denied access into a Member State and turned away thus putting that person in 
risk of said treatment or punishment. Denying a person access to or expelling from the 
Member State may also have the effect of raising issues under the right guaranteed under 
Article 2 of the convention, the right to life, or indeed other convention rights.21 Therefore                                                         
17 The exception covers refugees for whom there are reasonable grounds to regard as a danger to the security 
of the country in accordance with Art. 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.  
18 UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, January 26, 2007. 
19 Ibid 5, p. 204. It should also be noted that the matter is currently being disputed.  
20 Ibid 5, p. 188.  
21 E.g. on Art. 6 (right to a fair trial) see European Court of Human Rights, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. 
Turkey, Nos 46827/99, 46951/99, February 4, 2005; more generally on Art. 2 (right to life) and Art. 15(2) 
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convention rights may be pleaded to prevent non-admission, expulsion or extradition of an 
alien to a state where he or she may face treatment or punishment prohibited under the 
ECHR. This would suggest a de facto right to asylum.  
 
Although jurisdiction is traditionally linked to the territory of a state, it may also come into 
question where states exercise ‘effective control’ extraterritorially. Effective control 
typically entails the use of public power by one state over individuals or another state 
outside its own territory so as to attach accountability or attributability to itself22. In a 
human rights context the function of jurisdiction differs from the function in a general 
public international law setting. It is not here the question of legal entitlement for a state to 
act or refrain from acting but rather the issue of whether or not to grant persons certain 
rights.23 As exemplified by the following cases, this view of jurisdiction as deriving from 
practice rather than from strict legal entitlement is nonetheless in line with the view of 
public international law as held by the International Court of Justice24:  
 
‘Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the 
basis for state liability for acts affecting other states.’25 
 
The applicability of the ECHR is limited to situations within the jurisdiction of a Member 
State of the Council of Europe. However, the applicability of the rights enshrined in the 
convention may be triggered pursuant to a Member State exercising effective control over 
persons at high seas or other no-man’s land.26 France attempted to argue that persons in the 
transit zone of Paris airport were not under the jurisdiction of France and therefore the 
convention rights did not apply. The European Court of Human Rights disagreed and held 
that the domestic laws of France did not guarantee the persons’ right to liberty under 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(prohibition of derogation from certain convention rights) see European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. 
United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, July 7, 1989.  
22 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 48787/99, July 8, 
2004; European Court of Human Rights, Banković and others v. Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey and the UK, No. 52207/99, December 12, 2001. 
23 T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum – International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration 
Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 46. 
24 Ibid, p. 107.  
25 International Court of Justice, Namibia (South West Africa) Case, June 21, 1971, para. 53.  
26 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, No. 39473/98, 
January 11, 2001 and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, No. 27765/09, February 23, 2012. 
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Article 5 of the ECHR.27 In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Italian authorities had 
intercepted at sea a boat carrying some 200 migrants, including asylum seekers. The 
migrants were summarily returned to Libya pursuant to a bilateral agreement between the 
authorities of Italy and Libya. The European Court of Human Rights stated that despite the 
migrants failing to seek asylum while in captivity, Italy was not exempted from complying 
with the convention. In the court’s opinion, there was a risk that the persons could be 
subjected to punishment or treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the convention. The 
court applied the concept of ‘constructive notice’, according to which the Italian authorities 
should have known how their Libyan counterparts apparently fulfilled their obligations vis-
à-vis the protection of refugees and that many of the migrants onboard where subject to be 
further deported back to their respective countries of origin, namely Somalia and Eritrea. 
The Italian authorities were duly found to be in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
Although the ECHR does not directly guarantee the right to asylum, it can apply and be 
appealed to for the purpose of evading expulsion or extradition of an alien to a country 
where he or she may face treatment that contradicts with the rights guaranteed under the 
convention, most frequently the right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In essence this de facto right may have the effect of 
rendering the state in question unable to return the alien and may have to eventually after 
prolonged residence offer that person permanent residence.  
 
 
2.1.3 European Union Law 
 
The European Union also imposes obligations regarding the protection of asylum seekers 
onto Member States through primary and secondary sources of EU law. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU became legally binding with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The Charter lists in a single document the rights Member States 
of the Union are obliged to protect. It also quite unprecedentedly provides for the right to 
asylum28 as well as for the prohibition of refoulement29. The Treaty on the Functioning of 
                                                        
27 European Court of Human Rights, Amuur v. France, No. 19776/92, June 25, 1996 at 52-54. 
28 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Art. 18. 
29 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Art. 19. 
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the European Union30 makes direct reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention requiring 
that all measures adopted under the Common European Asylum System be respecting of 
the states’ obligations under the convention. It could even be argued that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has entrenched fragments if not all of the Refugee 
Convention into applicable EU law by virtue of Salahadin Abdulla and Others31, where the 
CJEU stated: 
 
‘It is apparent from recitals 3, 16 and 17 in the preamble to the Directive32 that 
the Geneva Convention constitutes the cornerstone of the international legal 
regime for the protection of refugees and that the provisions of the Directive 
for determining who qualifies for refugee status and the content thereof were 
adopted to guide the competent authorities of the Member States in the 
application of that convention on the basis of common concepts and criteria.’ 
 
In the framework of the Union the right of access to asylum is guaranteed by the Asylum 
Procedures Directive33 as well as the Charter. Although the Charter commits to the right to 
asylum, EU law does not provide for the facilitation of entry for asylum seekers into the 
territory of the EU for the purpose of applying for asylum. Third country nationals, who 
are required under EU law to possess a visa to enter the territory of the Union, will be so 
required whether or not they are tourists, businessmen or asylum seekers.  
 
The scope of application of the Asylum Procedures Directive is limited to the territory of 
the Member States, including airport transit zones and the borders34. However, Article 6(2) 
and (5) of the directive require that Member States practically ensure that asylum seekers 
have effective access to the procedure. This does not change the fact that the directive only                                                         
30 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 78(1): ‘The Union shall develop a common policy 
on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the 
Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.’ 
31 Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, March 2, 2010, at 52. 
32 The CJEU was referring to Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. 
33 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
34 Asylum Procedures Directive, Art. 3(1). 
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becomes applicable once a person reaches the territory, border or transit zone of a Member 
State. It could perhaps be argued that the asylum acquis is applicable where a Member 
State is engaged in extraterritorial refugee status determination. However, it would be quite 
inconceivable that the same rules were to apply where a Member State is not engaged in 
extraterritorial status determination but nonetheless exercises effective control over another 
person. Consequently it would appear that Member States are not under an obligation to 
apply the safeguards of the directive to third country nationals present in their own country 
or another third country, especially so if there is no element of status determination.   
As the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union entrenches into directly 
applicable primary EU law the provisions of the Refugee Convention as well as the 
principle of non-refoulement and right to apply for asylum, Member States are under an 
obligation to act accordingly in executing the common policy on asylum. The Commission 
in devising and executing the common policy alike is bound to adhere to the respective 
sources of law.  
 
 
2.2 Right to Leave One’s Country 
 
The right to apply for asylum from persecution by default entails the existence of an 
empowering right to be able to leave one’s own country, as asylum cannot be sought 
without leaving one’s country of origin first. The right to leave, too, is widely recognised 
in international human law instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.35 
  
The legal framework surrounding the collective responsibility of states to protect refugees 
and asylum seekers is a complex and yet developing web of inter-related rights, rules and 
obligations. Member States of the European Union are bound by various norms regarding 
the principle of non-refoulement and the right to asylum. However, due to territorial 
restrictions re the applicability of the asylum acquis and varying degrees of protection 
accorded by the various legal sources, the situation is far from clear. The right to leave                                                         
35 Justified restrictions for this otherwise universal right may include, inter alia, the protection of national 
security or to prevent a criminal suspect from fleeing the country.  
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one’s own country, too, is embodied in various international legal instruments, yet as no 
corresponding subjective right to be admitted by any other country exists, a paradoxical 
situation ensues. Containment measures such as interceptions at sea and other barriers to 
entry, which are discussed in the following chapter, may have the effect of hindering one’s 
ability to exercise this right.  
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3. Barriers to Entry 
 
Despite obligations deriving from various legal instruments at international, regional and 
national level, access to the territory of the Member States of the European Union is 
limited. Limited access of asylum seekers to the territory of the Member States is often 
attributed to a plethora of measures adopted at EU level. These comprise, inter alia, visa 
requirements and other pre-frontier controls, carrier sanctions and policies at the external 
borders of the Union. While asylum seekers worldwide are growing in numbers and the 
number of asylum claims in the EU were until recently at an all-time low, it is not all that 
far-fetched to suggest that border control and entry measures adopted in the EU have a role 
to play in this.  
 
Carrier sanctions, or imposing strict liability on transportation service providers to ensure 
that they transport only passengers fulfilling the entry requirements, first appeared in the 
1990 Schengen Convention. This strict liability encompasses fines as well as the duty to 
return passengers without proper documentation to the place of departure. These so-called 
carrier sanctions may very well have the effect of deterring both the transportation 
companies and the asylum seekers. First, the companies are pressured into exercising 
particular caution when assessing the documents of what the staff may or may not deem as 
potential asylum seekers and even impose more rigid requirements to qualify for a ticket 
entitling the holder to enter the vehicle. Second, asylum seekers are more likely to be 
refused ticket sales, as staff members of the transportation companies will exercise extra 
vigilance in fear of being penalised.36 
 
Another topical barrier to entry presents itself as interceptions at sea, or ‘pushbacks’. The 
phenomenon is self-explanatory. Suspicious vessels in the area of both Member States and 
of third countries as well as vessels in the high seas are monitored and occasionally 
intercepted and being ordered to return to the port of departure. The concerns are naturally 
that asylum seekers onboard are denied access to international protection or even that the 
returnees face persecution, which as it were, could have very well been the original reason 
                                                        
36 See e.g. C. Rodier, Analysis of the External Dimension of the EU’s Asylum and Immigration Policies 
(Brussels: European Parliament, 2006). 
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for leaving that particular third country. There is moreover a whole study to be written on 
the international legal aspects of denying citizens the right to leave their own country37.  
 
Overwhelmed by the awesome and rigorous procedure of gaining legal means of entering 
the territory of the EU, migrants and especially asylum seekers are forced to make use of 
irregular means of travel. Many find themselves in exploitative situations where smugglers 
and human-traffickers have no regard to the human rights, safety or wellbeing of their 
clients/victims. Attempts at crossing the Mediterranean Sea with an unseaworthy vessel in 
hope of a better life seldom finish with a flourish. The devastating tragedy in Lampedusa 
in October 2013 is but one instance of the all too well known affair that is called irregular 
migration in want of legal means to enter.  
 
Visa requirements constitute a paramount barrier to entry, especially for those fleeing 
persecution. There remains a great deal to be said about the other barriers to entry for 
asylum seekers such as carrier sanctions, interceptions at sea and the use of immigration 
liaison officer networks operating in third countries, whose sole task is to combat illegal 
migration. However, this chapter focuses on visa regimes as barriers to entry and considers 
the various legal instruments in place. 
 
 
3.1 Entry requirements – the Legal and Political Framework 
 
It is of course no novelty that sovereign states impose requirements on entry. It is 
recognised in international law38 that states have such a right. This right will also 
inevitably include the right to refuse entry and to expel third country nationals not 
fulfilling the prescribed conditions for entry. Emmerich de Vattel in The Law of Nations 
observed that as a matter of sovereignty and right of domain, conditions on the permission 
to enter the territory could be prescribed.39 Requirements for entry are often related to the 
person planning to enter the area of the state. However, these personal characteristics 
pertaining to the eligibility to enter will on various occasions be examined through the 
narrative of the applicant’s country of origin and conditions related thereto. It is no surprise                                                         
37 See chapter 2 above. 
38 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, July 7, 1989. 
39 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co), Book 2, Chapter 8, § 100.  
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to find that currently all major refugee-producing third countries are among those countries 
whose citizens must be in possession of a visa to enter the territory of the Member States 
of the European Union. Similarly measures where the increase in asylum applications is a 
condition for triggering the measure are being adopted to more readily impose visa 
requirements for citizens of third countries whose nationals are currently not required to 
have a visa.  
 
A visible trend in EU external border policy is the so-called securitization of the policy 
area. Securitization as considered by the Copenhagen School is taken as a starting point for 
this argument according to which, policy is securitized through successful speech acts. The 
topical threat is moved away from the political arena into somewhere apolitical so as to 
legitimate the employment of emergency measures without going through the normal 
democratic/legitimate process.40 The formulation of security discourse with regard to EU 
external border policy is possibly most apparent in the 1990 Convention Applying the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, ‘…which connects immigration and asylum with 
terrorism, transnational crime and border control.’41 It does not, however, necessarily 
follow that the policy field has been securitized insofar as the term is understood as 
remitting the issue away from the normal legislative procedure into something lighter, 
something that will address the issue less formally because it has to be by virtue of its 
nature. As far as the EU is concerned, the common policy on visas and other short-stay 
residence permits is achieved by the European Parliament and the Council acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure42. The Commission has, however, 
issued a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on an Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) for the Community Immigration Policy43. The OMC is a form of 
so-called new governance, whereby measures and tools may be adopted in order to achieve 
better policies in a less formal manner. The forms of new governance in the field of 
migration policy tend to be restricted to further information sharing and the encouragement 
of more inter-agency and intergovernmental cooperation. This is discussed in more detail 
below in the context of the safeguard clause and the Visa Regulation; where there may be 
                                                        
40 H. Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’, 13 European Journal of 
International Relations 3 (2007), 357-383 at 358. 
41J. Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, 38 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 5 (2000), 751-777 at 757. 
42 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 77(2)(a). 
43 COM(2001)387 final. 
  17 
room to argue that some aspects of migration policy are taken out of the sphere of properly 
understood democratic decision-making.  
 
The following considers the various requirements and mechanisms with regard to EU visa 
policy that constitute barriers to entry as features of the visa regime and therefore 
potentially discourage bona fide asylum seekers from undertaking to legally enter the 
country in which he or she intends to apply for asylum and instead resort to irregular 
means of crossing the border. Furthermore, official visa statistics compiled by the 
Commission will be presented to illustrate the arguments put forward. The identifiable 
barriers to entry as part and parcel of EU visa policy are dealt with in detail below and 
presented in relation to the relevant legal source.  
 
 
3.2 Schengen Borders Code 
 
The entry conditions for third country nationals in the Schengen framework, in other words 
non-EU or EEA Member State nationals, are listed out in the Schengen Borders Code44. 
Currently, EU law only regulates short-term stays45 whereas the issuance of residence 
permits is regulated at national level. For the purpose of short-term stays, the third country 
national must first of all be in possession of a valid travel document authorising him or her 
to cross the border. The recognition of travel documents issued by third country nationals 
is within the national competence of each Member State. However, the Commission has 
instituted a committee, the Travel Document Committee, under the comitology procedure 
in order to enhance cooperation and harmonisation within this field. The third country 
national must be in possession of a valid visa, if required so by the Visa Regulation46. The 
third country national entering the Schengen Area must furthermore, elaborate the purpose 
and conditions of the intended stay. This will include proof of means of subsistence during 
both stay and return to the country of origin. The person must not be the target of an alert 
issued in the Schengen Information System (SIS) – otherwise entry may be refused. All 
entries in the SIS are called alerts. This rigid set of requirements is accompanied by the                                                         
44 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, Art. 5. 
45 Stays not exceeding three months per six-month period. 
46 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement. 
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less definitive requirement that the third country national not to be considered a threat to 
public policy, international security, public health or the international relations of any of 
the Member States.  
 
The first practical barrier to entry for asylum seekers is the requirement of having a valid 
travel document. This is discussed in further detail in the context of visas. However, 
pursuant to Article 5(4)(b) of the Schengen Borders Code, a visa may also be affixed on a 
separate sheet if e.g. the person is in possession of a travel document not recognised by the 
visa issuing authority. Providing proof of means of subsistence as well as producing a valid 
travel document will most likely prove burdensome for the refugee fleeing a warzone. The 
likely visa applicant from Syria in 2014 will most probably be unable to produce proof of 
being capable of providing for oneself during her stay in the territory of the Schengen 
Member State in question. Moreover, the purpose of the intended stay, in all likelihood 
being to apply for asylum, will almost undoubtedly lead to a negative visa decision. 
Having been the object of e.g. deportation from the Schengen Area in the past, the person 
is more than likely to find oneself the target of an alert in the SIS, again leading to a 
negative visa decision. A change in circumstances may have the effect of rendering the 
alert moot, however, the process for removing an alert in the SIS is an arduous one, 
especially so when the potential error is noticed by a Member State other than the one that 
issued the alert in the first place.47 The original deportation and alert may have been 
executed pursuant to e.g. a car theft. Motive behind such a response is straightforward 
enough, however nothing to do with the current matter of applying for a visa in order to 
flee persecution. The purpose of the use of such deportation orders and subsequent alerts 
relate to the prior conduct of the person and quite possibly have nothing to do with the 
eligibility to qualify for refugee status.  
 
It should, however, be noted that the aforementioned barriers, including the requirement to 
be in possession of a valid visa, may be waived due to humanitarian grounds, on grounds 
of national interest or because of international obligations pursuant to Article 5(4) SBC. 
This is further elaborated in connection to the prospects presented by the notion of the visa 
with limited territorial validity in chapter 5.                                                         
47 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, especially Chapter 3 on Protection of Personal Data and 
Security of Data in the Schengen Information System. 
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3.3 The Visa Regulation 
 
The Visa Regulation, along with its Annexes, lists out the countries whose nationals have 
to be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals 
are exempt from that requirement. As the Visa Regulation also regulates the so-called 
safeguard clause, this section will underline the further tightening or securitization of 
migration-related matters in the field of visas as opposed to facilitating the legal entry of 
persons in need of international protection.  
 
The 124 states48 to which a visa requirement is attached are found in Annex I of the 
Regulation. In addition, other entities and territorial authorities that are not recognised as 
states by at least one Member State, including the Palestinian Authority, are among those 
subject to the visa requirement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 1 – countries whose nationals have to be in possession of a visa to enter the territory of the Member States. 
                                                         
48 Situation in early 2014. 
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A significant minority of states along with a handful of other entities are exempt from the 
visa requirement (Annex II). None of the states on the African continent are on this list and 
only a handful of Asian states have made the cut. Following a superficial glance, it would 
appear that most states in the positive list (those exempt from the visa requirement) are 
either OECD states, implying a certain degree of financial stability or otherwise high-
income economies, or in other respects politically close to the EU. It is clear that the 
discussion on transferring a country from one list to the other has both political and 
security-related reasons and may very well have far-reaching ramifications. This latter 
aspect highlights the importance of visa policy as a foreign policy tool to be employed by 
the EU to attain its goals.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       Image 2 – List of third countries whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement. 
 
The Visa Working Party is the forum at EU level where delegates from Member States 
discuss the amendments to be made to the Visa Regulation and the Annexes. These 
discussions long focused, and finally resulted in the introduction of a safeguard clause, 
allowing the rapid, temporary suspension of the visa waiver for a third country on the 
positive list in case of an emergency situation, as a last resort:50  
                                                         
49 Recently the EU temporarily suspended the so-called visa dialogue with the Russian Federation as a 
reaction to the 2014 Crimean Crisis. The visa dialogue is aimed at negotiating the possibility of visa free 
travel between the EU and the Russian Federation.  
50 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation 
(EC) 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, COM(2011) 290 final. 
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‘2. A Member State may notify the Commission if it is confronted, over a six-
month period, in comparison with the same period in the previous year or with 
the last six months prior to the implementation of the exemption from the visa 
requirement for nationals of a third country listed in Annex II, with one or 
more of the following circumstances leading to an emergency situation which 
it is unable to remedy on its own, namely a substantial and sudden increase in 
the number of:    
(a) nationals of that third country found to be staying in the Member State's 
territory without a right thereto; 
(b) asylum applications from the nationals of that third country for which the 
recognition rate is low, where such an increase is leading to specific pressures 
on the Member State's asylum system;  
(c) rejected readmission applications submitted by the Member State to that 
third country for its own nationals.’51 
 
Upon fulfilment of a former mentioned requirement and the notification thereof the 
Commission will launch a special examination procedure and may eventually adopt an 
implementing act temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement.52 The 
French-Dutch Note to the Council in 2010 advocating for such a mechanism53 also listed 
out grounds such as the abuse of asylum and failure of the third country in question to 
fulfil its obligations as regards readmission as grounds that would trigger the suspension 
mechanism.  
  
This safeguard clause, as pointed out earlier, is where migration policy may be affected 
through less formal means and outside the democratic procedure, whereby normally, the 
third country would have to be transferred to the negative list according to the ordinary 
legislative procedure, possibly taking months. It will be interesting to see how readily 
Member States are willing to propose the triggering of the very recently adopted safeguard 
clause and how the Commission will react to those pleas. The liberalisation or emergence 
                                                        
51 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (PE-CONS 65/13) amending Council 
Regulation (EC) 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Note from the French and Netherlands delegations to the Council - Establishment of a mechanism to 
suspend visa liberalisation, 21 December 2010 (18212/10). 
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of such less top-down mechanisms may very well contribute to the perceived fortification 
of Europe and its borders to the exclusion of non-Europeans.  
 
Image 3 – Visa requirements for the Schengen Area.54 
 
The adoption of the amending Regulation introducing the infamous safeguard clause 
speaks to the embraced future policy direction in contemporary visa policy of the EU. The 
mechanism was proposed as a response to the rise of unfounded asylum claims and 
unsuccessful attempts to readmit citizens from Western Balkan countries residing illegally 
in the EU.55 However, considering the reference in Art. 1a(2)(b) on the increase of asylum 
claims, it is clear that the mechanism could potentially be triggered pursuant to a genuine 
rise of asylum applications brought about by a humanitarian crisis in the outskirts of the 
external borders of the EU in a country whose citizens could prior to the crisis benefit from 
visa exemption. This mechanism can have the effect of frustrating the expectations of third 
country nationals then exempt from the visa requirement who subsequently become subject 
to the requirement pursuant to a change in circumstances such as armed conflict, natural 
disaster, famine or any other phenomenon that may have the effect of commencing mass 
movements of people.                                                          
54 Image taken from the European Commission Home Affairs website on Visa policy, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm> 
(accessed September 4, 2013). 
55 European Commission, ‘EU Visa Policy: ensuring legal certainty and preventing abuse’, MEMO/11/328, 
Press Release, May 24, 2011. 
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3.4 The EU Visa Code 
 
The EU Visa Code56 regulates the issuance of visas, providing for certain requirements to 
be met for the issuance of a visa and lists the grounds on which a visa may be refused. A 
visa, for our purposes, means an authorisation – capable of being affixed to a travel 
document – issued by a Member State to enter the territory of the Member States. Visa 
applications are predominantly examined and decided on by Member State consulates 
situated or accredited to the region where the visa applicant resides.57 In examining the 
visa application, the consulate shall ascertain whether the applicant fulfils the entry 
conditions set out in the Schengen Borders Code. Due regard is had to the assessment 
whether the applicant presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of the 
Member States and whether the applicant intends to leave the territory before the expiry of 
the visa applied for.58 This encompasses a comprehensive verification of the authenticity of 
the travel document submitted as well as the supporting documents attached as evidence of 
intention to travel and other considerations related to the person of the applicant. 
Exhaustive lists of required supporting documents as well as common criteria for 
examining applications are often compiled in the guise of Local Schengen Cooperation59 in 
the third country in question. This is intended to enhance the adoption of a uniform 
approach by all Member States in any given region.  
 
The grounds for refusal of a visa are listed out in Article 32. From the various grounds, 
some more than others, pose problematic hindrances to travelling, and may have the effect 
of further thwarting efforts of asylum seekers to enter the territory. Failure to provide 
justification for the purpose and conditions of the intended stay will result in the refusal of 
a visa. The wording is sufficiently clear, but fails to make certain the threshold that 
constitutes ‘sufficient justification’. Failure to provide proof of sufficient means of 
subsistence equally leads to a refusal of the visa. For example, the Embassy of Finland in 
Windhoek, Namibia, evaluates the means of subsistence at EUR 30 per day in order to 
                                                        
56 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 
a Community Code on Visas. 
57 Visa Code, Art. 4(1). See also Art. 4 for exceptions. 
58 Visa Code, Art. 21(1). 
59 Visa Code, Art. 48.  
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cover the expenses of stay and return.60 The competent Swedish authority, the Migration 
Board, has set this sum at EUR 50 (SEK 450)61. This feature underlines the socially and 
economically discriminative stance adopted by the EU in terms of welcomed visitors. The 
motivation of Member States in securing their social security systems from unwanted 
further burdens may nonetheless be understood, especially insofar that the estimated 
savings of intercepting an individual irregular migrant of EUR 50,000 according to an 
action programme by the Ministry of Interior of Finland are assumed correct62. The figure 
will obviously vary from one Member State to the next.  
 
The statistics concerning grounds upon which visas are refused are not public. However, 
general data on the volume of refusals and issued visas are available. The statistics 
illustrate the differences between third countries and how nationals of certain third 
countries are more readily eligible for visas than those of others. In 2013, in St. Petersburg, 
out of a whopping 1,204,670 common Schengen visas applied for in the Consulate General 
of Finland, only 9,505 visas were refused (0.8%). Moreover, of all the common Schengen 
visas issued in this consulate, 1,000,578 were multiple entry visas (98%). Contrarily, out of 
a total of 715 visas applied for in Abuja, Nigeria, the Embassy of Finland refused 349 visas 
(48.8%).63 These unambiguous findings come to show how for example Sub-Saharan 
African countries are seen as high-risk sources for illegal migration and other undesirable 
conduct. The table below exemplifies the aforementioned discriminatory nature of EU visa 
policy in terms of economic wellbeing and the affect thereof to the prospects of becoming 
a successful visa applicant. These third countries in question were chosen for this table due 
to their varying positions regarding economic stability, democratic values, ties with the EU 
and overall stability and how the aforementioned qualities illustrate the perceived risk of 
illegal migration. 
                                                         
60 See e.g. The Embassy of Finland, Windhoek website, available at 
<http://www.finland.org.na/public/default.aspx?contentid=142114&nodeid=41059&contentlan=2&culture=e
n-US> (accessed March 7, 2014).  
61 See The Swedish Migration Board website, available at <http://www.migrationsverket.se> (accessed 
March 18, 2014). 
62 Action Programme on Illegal Migration (Laittoman maahantulon vastainen toimintaohjelma 2012-2015) 
<http://www.intermin.fi/download/38506_372012_Lama_toimenpideohjelma_web.pdf> (accessed March 16, 
2014), p.6. 
63 These figures are based on the EU Directorate-General on Home Affairs statistics of 2013. Complete 
statistics on short-stay visas issued by the Schengen States (2013), available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm> 
(accessed March 7, 2014). 
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Location of 
Consulates Schengen State 
Visas 
applied 
Visas 
denied % 
Belarus  Poland 272,172 0.27% 
Russia Finland 1,501,223 0.55% 
Ukraine Estonia 17,576 3.00% 
China Lithuania 857 4.80% 
Bolivia Spain 7,137 15.70% 
Nigeria Finland 715 48.80% 
Afghanistan Germany 2,828 51.80% 
Jordan Norway 1,161 61.40% 
Syria (2012) Sweden 466 76.82% 
   Image 4 – Statistics of visas applied in certain third countries and the ratio of visas denied.  
 
In third countries such as China and Belarus, the likelihood of being issued a visa is rather 
promising. Belarus has a close relationship with Poland and people living close to the 
border often work across the border, which explains the practically non-existent ratio of 
negative visa decisions. China is otherwise a relatively prosperous state and in fact the 
Chinese form an impressive fraction of the tourist body of third country nationals in 
Europe. The same cannot be said about war-torn Syria and Afghanistan, which are both 
major refugee-producing countries and the perceived risk of staying illegally after the 
expiration of the visa is extremely high. 
 
The Commission is always eager in purporting to improve rights of citizens, including 
those of third countries. The Visa Code provides for an unprecedented Union-wide system 
of appeal in case of refusal, annulment and non-voluntary revocation of a visa.64 Due 
regard is clearly had to the rights of the applicant as per his or her legal protection and 
legal safeguards. However, the appeals shall be conducted against the Member State that 
has taken the decision in accordance to the national law of that Member State. The 
obligation to establish an appeals mechanism has been imposed on the Member States. 
However the actual setting up of the appeals mechanism is left to the discretion of the 
individual Member States. This has led to gaping differences in the approaches adopted by 
Members.  
 
For instance in Finland, the Administrative Procedure Act governs the appeal mechanism 
to be followed pursuant to a negative decision on a visa application65. The procedure of 
appeal is a fairly light one, whereby the instance giving the original decision will decide on                                                         
64 Visa Code, Arts 32(2) and 34(7). 
65 Finnish Administrative Procedure Act 6.6.2003/434, Chapter 7 a. 
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the rectification request. This does not, however, mean that the person taking the initial 
decision will decide on the appeal. In practice, the person taking the decision on the appeal 
would likely be a senior consular officer or even the ambassador in smaller embassies. The 
procedure is different for family members of EU/EEA citizens: the appeal will be 
conducted on a more thorough and heavy procedure in which the issue is decided in the 
Administrative Court. The rectification request must be done in one of the official 
languages of Finland and is free of charge. The likely third country visa applicant does not 
master Finnish or Swedish or the procedural requirements related to the submission of a 
rectification request and would therefore require the services of a trained lawyer. 
Contrasting this to the Italian stance adopted, differences are glaring. The procedure first of 
all bears a cost of 250 EUR and also without doubt requires the assistance of an Italian 
lawyer. Not only does the discretion provided for by Article 32 of the Visa Code create 
yawning differences in state practices – it may hardly be seen to meet the requirements of 
Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which ‘[e]very person has 
the right to have his or her affairs handled … within a reasonable time.’ If a decision on the 
appeal takes a couple weeks or even months during peak times in tourism, the lapse of time 
has more than likely already frustrated the initial purpose of travel into the Schengen Area. 
The European Court of Human Rights may also have a bone to pick with some of the 
Member States concerning Article 13, on the right to an effective remedy, of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This issue could perhaps arise in the context where an 
unsuccessful visa applicant claims there has been a case of prejudicial profiling and the 
appeal procedure is not sufficient. Consider for example the case where the persecuted 
third country national visa applicant in a Schengen Member State consulate appealing the 
negative visa decision the procedure of which will be governed by national law potentially 
demanding payment, providing for a time limit of 6 months to deal with the appeal and 
requiring that the appeal be submitted in the language of the Schengen Member State in 
question.  
 
Whilst the Visa Code aims to endorse and promote fundamental rights and openness, 
practice seems to suggest the contrary. Fully-fledged coordination and harmonisation in 
the field of dealing with appeals is perhaps impossible. The current provision enabling the 
right to appeal, however, works akin to that of a directive, the implementation of which 
seems to deviate from one Member State to the next even more than in the case of regular 
directives. Neither is true accountability promoted to the fullest, seeing as e.g. in the case 
  27 
of Finland, third country nationals have no avenue of redress once the first instance, the 
rectification procedure, is exhausted. 
 
The Commission published its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Union Code on Visas (Visa Code)66 on 1 April 2014. Essentially, the 
amendment (or new regulation) takes into account and deals with the increased political 
emphasis given to the economic impact of visa policy in line with the Commission’s 
Communication ‘Implementation and development of the common visa policy to spur 
growth in the European Union’67. Should the proposed text be adopted as is, common visa 
policy should become more ‘user-friendly and efficient’. The proposal e.g. introduces a 
distinction between first-time travellers and regular travellers. The latter would benefit 
from certain procedural facilitations. It is debatable whether or not this could have an 
adverse effect on the procedural requirements that first-time travellers would have to meet, 
which within the scope of this paper is more relevant. These could comprise stricter 
requirements regarding acceptable supporting documents or an elevated subsistence or a 
more extensive travel medical insurance.  
 
 
3.5 Airport Transit Visas 
 
A separately regulated visa under the Visa Code, the airport transport visa (ATV), presents 
a further barrier to entry and access to international protection. An airport transit visa is a 
visa that is valid for transit through the international transit areas of one or more airports of 
the Member States68. The common list of third countries whose citizens have to be in 
possession of an ATV when passing through the international transit areas of airports in 
the EU are listed in Annex IV of the Visa Code69. They include major refugee-producing 
countries such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq and Somalia. In addition, there exists 
a Member State-specific list of third countries whose nationals are required to be in 
                                                        
66 COM(2014) 164 final. 
67 COM(2012) 649 final. 
68 Visa Code, Art. 2(5).  
69 Visa Code, Art. 3(1).  
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possession of an ATV when passing through the international transit areas situated on the 
territory of one or more Member States70. 
 
Airport transit zones have in some cases been treated not as an integral part of the territory 
of the State. Therefore, neither domestic provisions nor international obligations 
concerning international protection and humanitarian law apply. The imposition of the 
requirement to obtain an ATV thus effectively prevents asylum applications at airports 
from individuals in transit.71 While this may happen in practice, the European Court of 
Human Rights has in Shamsa v. Poland72 stated that the European Convention on Human 
Rights does indeed apply in airport transit zones and that the detention of two migrant 
brothers was unlawful pursuant to Artilce 5 of the convention. Even so, the convention 
does not provide for a subjective right to apply for asylum. The de facto right of asylum as 
discussed in chapter 2 above may however come into question. 
 
 
3.6 Contemporary Issues: Other Barriers  
 
In addition to the above there remain certain issues that are especially of a contemporary 
nature associated with political and practical themes. Geographic and political realities 
regarding the locations of embassies and consulates play a huge role in an asylum seeker’s 
access to apply for a visa. Furthermore, advanced consultation procedures permitted by 
highly technical equipment and the proliferation of databases may, too, have a further 
exclusionary effect on third country nationals who are deemed unwanted by even no more 
than one Member State.   
3.6.1 Consular Coverage and Spatial Difficulties 
 
An understandable criticism voiced against Member States is that nationals of third 
countries in more remote locations are unfairly put in a disadvantaged position insofar as 
there may not be a consulate of the destination Member State within hundreds or even                                                         
70 See the Commission Decision of 19.3.2010 on establishing the Handbook for the processing of visa 
applications and the modification of issued visas, Annex 7b. 
71 See e.g. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe’, 
December, 2007, p. 27. 
72 European Court of Human Rights, Shamsa v. Poland, No. 45355/99, 45357/99, November 27, 2003.  
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thousands of miles. Furthermore travelling excessive distances from one country to the 
next only for applying for a visa may pose unreasonable burdens to bear along with 
personal security-related threats. Consider, for example, the Afghan wishing to visit her 
son in Finland. She would be required to travel a thousand miles from Kabul to New Delhi 
for lodging a visa application, while going through Pakistan, possibly be required to 
acquire a visa from the Pakistani authorities too, only to discover that her visa will (quite 
likely) be refused in the coming weeks. Similar distances may apply even when the visa-
issuing consulate is located in the same country as the applicant. The situation is further 
impeded by the modern trend of downsizing and outright winding up of peripheral 
consulates, not least due to budgetary motives73.  
 
In order to tackle the issue of diminishing consular coverage – which includes the 
provision of visa services – especially in the more remote areas, the Visa Code provides 
for a possibility of arranging visa representation as between Schengen Member States. To 
illustrate, Finland represents Hungary in visa issues in Peru and Dar Es Salam. 
Reciprocally, Hungary represents Finland in visa matters in Chisinau and Chongqing. 
Article 8 of the Visa Code enables the governance and creation of a complex network of 
representation agreements. The Member States agree, in essence, to outsource the issuance 
and refusal of visas in a given third country. This includes the verification of entry 
conditions and risk assessment with an emphasis on the assessment of whether the 
applicant presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of the Member 
States. In other words, plenty of discretion is handed out, discretion that will inevitably 
affect the eligibility of a third country national to be issued a visa, in part because the 
representing consulate will also apply its own national administrative laws in addition to 
the provisions of the Visa Code. This may lead to peculiarities of the representing state’s 
administrative law affecting the rights of the applicant: on occasion to his or her detriment. 
 
There are, however, no sanctions prescribed for not expanding the consular coverage of a 
Member State through representation agreements. It may in fact even be seen as a burden 
for smaller states, seeing as reciprocity is the name of the game and smaller Member States 
have less impressive consular coverage. The representing state will undoubtedly request 
the represented state in question to represent them in another jurisdiction. Whilst it is                                                         
73 E.g. the closing of the Embassy of Finland in Islamabad, Pakistan, which can hardly even be considered 
peripheral in terms of political importance. 
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undisputed that the representation agreements are well in place to tackle the problem of 
consular absence with regard to more remote third countries where Member States are 
generally not present, the problem persists. 
 
Another topical problem in the field of consular coverage is the temporary or permanent 
closing of consulates once the severity of a crisis surpasses a given threshold. The majority 
of Member States’ consulates in Damascus were soon closed after the Syrian Uprising 
began. Once this happened, there were simply no means of applying for a visa other than 
to attempt at reaching the nearest visa-issuing consulate abroad. In the case of the 2011 
Syrian Uprising, for many Member States it would come to be their embassies in Ankara.  
 
The Commission in its proposal for a new Visa Code addresses the issue of insufficient 
geographical coverage in visa processing. A general notion of ‘Schengen Visa Centre’ is 
introduced. Reference is made to the concept of mandatory representation ‘according to 
which, if the Member State competent to process the visa application is neither present nor 
represented (under such an arrangement) in a given third country any other Member State 
present in that country would be obliged to process visa applications on their behalf.’74 
Representation arrangements, cooperation with external service providers and resource 
pooling are also mentioned as means to tackle the insufficient geographical consular 
coverage. It will be fascinating to see how the Member States respond to this notion of 
mandatory representation and whether or not it will survive to the adopted text.  
  
3.6.2 Prior Consultation of Central Authorities 
 
A Member State may require the central authorities of other Member States to consult its 
central authorities during the examination of visa applications lodged by nationals of 
specific third countries or specific categories of such nationals.75 This applies not only to 
the Member State of final destination but others, too. The determination of competent 
central authorities is up to each individual Member State. It may nonetheless be safe to 
assume that in most cases the central authority would be the national intelligence service or 
other security service dealing with sensitive information involving risk analysis, personal                                                          
74 COM(2014) 164 final, p. 4. 
75 Visa Code, Art. 22(1). Central authorities currently have seven days in which is they must reply to a prior 
consultation. Commission Proposal COM(2014) 164 final would amend this to a five day period.  
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data and national security. The list of 
those third countries, whose nationals 
or specific categories of such third 
country nationals who are subject to 
prior consultation is public. Member 
States notify requests for prior 
consultation to the Commission, who 
under Article 53(2) publishes the 
information regarding the third country 
concerned in Annex 16 of the Visa 
Code Handbook. However, the Visa 
Code does not provide for the 
publication of the information on 
which Member State requires prior 
consultation for which third countries 
or specific categories of third country 
nationals. In its initial proposal on the 
Visa Code in 200676, the Commission 
had with a view to enhancing 
transparency proposed that all 
information on prior consultation be 
accessible to the public, but this 
provision was not retained in the final 
compromise text adopted.77 Prior 
consultation constitutes a further hurdle to be overcome by the visa applicant who is 
subject to such additional procedures – another barrier to entry, especially when looking at 
the specific third countries on the list. The table lists out the third countries and specific 
groups of such third country nationals subject to prior consultation by one or more 
Member States. To illustrate, all citizens of Afghanistan are subject to the prior 
consultation by one or more Member States, while e.g. only holders of diplomatic and 
service passports from Belarus are subjects of prior consultation of authorities of one or                                                         
76 COM (2006) 403 final/2. 
77 Response from Head of Unit C2, European Commission DG HOME to e-mail inquiry, dated October 22, 
2013.  
Image 4 – Table of the nationalities and specific categories of persons 
who are subject to prior consultation. 
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more Member States. This underlines the external relations dimension of EU visa policy. It 
is moreover interesting to note that from the top 5 refugee-producing countries78 all are 
represented on the list. Perhaps even more fascinating is the fact that all stateless persons 
and persons with official refugee status are subject to prior consultation when applying for 
a visa.  
 
It would sincerely be an interesting exercise, should the consultation requirements be fully 
transparent on a Member State-to-Member State basis, to discern which States require 
prior consultation of stateless persons and persons with refugee status and for what 
reasons. One may but speculate; yet the lack of trust between Member States may very 
well be one fundamental reason for this. Also, it may be a contention of the Member 
States’ authorities that a person with refugee status can be deemed unlikely to leave the 
Schengen Area within the period of validity of his visa and he is indeed free to move 
within the territory of the Member States in want of internal border checks. 
 
 
3.6.3 Virtualization of Borders, the Self and Reality 
 
The potential and opportunities presented by advanced information sharing systems and 
databases in the field of security and migration have not gone unnoticed by the 
Commission. In the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on fighting trafficking in human beings - an integrated approach and proposals 
for an action plan,79 the Commission lays out certain means, which are necessary for the 
purpose of adopting an integrated approach for tackling the issue. The Communication 
states that the Council should as soon as possible implement biometric identifiers in visas 
and residence permits as this will assist in the identification of trafficked persons. Like the 
EU Plan on best practices, standards and procedures for combating and preventing 
trafficking in human beings80, also the EU Action Plan on combating terrorism81 calls for 
the proliferation of automatic data processing and other technologies for the identification                                                         
78 Situation in end 2013: Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Source: UNHCR Report, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html>. Situation may have changed 
as the Syrian Uprising as well as the conflicts in Central African Republic and Iraq persist.  
79 COM(2005) 514 final.  
80 2005/C 311/01. 
81 Note from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) to the Council/European Council – EU Action 
plan on combating terrorism, December 9, 2011, 17594/11. 
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of culprits as well as for information sharing purposes. Both underline the importance of 
the Visa Information System82 as well as the significance of the consultation procedure 
under Article 22 of the Visa Code within the Schengen consultation network. The use of 
biometrics for the purposes of visa applications, which are then stored on a common 
database accessible by all Member States and by Europol is also highlighted.  
 
More and more cooperation and information sharing is done via automated data processing 
means: arrest warrants and alerts on refusals of entry are issued within SIS83; and 
fingerprints along with bank statements of visa applicants are saved into huge servers to 
which all Member States have access to. It will be interesting to see the possible effects 
data protection instruments have on the full-scale proliferation of databases containing 
sensitive biometric data such as fingerprints and digital face images, not to mention retina 
scans, if they are introduced in the future. It is worthy of mention, however, that this very 
snowball effect in information gathering and transcending into the virtual domain is very 
much in sync with the Commission Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on an Open Method of Coordination for The Community Immigration Policy84, 
reinforcing the fight against trafficking by initiating measures to keep track of illegal 
movements and by promoting pre-frontier cooperation.  
 
Some argue that that the proliferation of databases has led to a virtualization of the borders 
and the self. The virtual self or ‘immaterial doppelganger’ is composed of every drop of 
information governments and private agencies have gathered on the person. From the 
nuggets of fragmented information border guards, consular officers and law enforcement 
officers conduct risk analyses and ultimately make value judgments on the person’s 
integrity and reliability e.g. for the purpose of assessing the eligibility to be issued a visa. 
Thus this apparent virtual self becomes dominant over the physical self and consequently 
the controlling source of particular information whether a question needs to be settled at 
the border or at some pre-frontier juncture.85  
                                                         
82 VIS became operational in Autumn 2011.  
83 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, Art. 96. 
84 COM(2001)387 final. 
85 O. Marenin, Challenges for Integrated Border Management in the European Union, (Geneva: Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010), pp. 48-54.     
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3.7 Barriers to Entry: Conclusions 
  
This chapter set out the various barriers to entry that asylum seekers are faced with. Carrier 
sanctions, interceptions at sea along with immigration liaison officer networks and 
stringent visa requirements all play their part in fortifying Europe. The conditions to be 
issued a visa are difficult to satisfy and may prove rather impossible for an asylum seeker 
fleeing persecution. Requirements pertaining to travel documents, available funds, 
insurance coverage and possibly having to travel extensive distances to reach a consulate 
in the first place to even lodge an application often prove inconceivable. Still, meeting 
these requirements does not yet entitle the applicant to a visa. Depending on the nationality 
and other personal characteristics of the applicant, the application may fail upon one or 
more Member States objecting to the issuance of the visa pursuant to the consultation 
procedure. The appeals system does not exactly present itself in the best light either in 
terms of providing legal guarantees and legal protection due to the highly technical nature 
and potential costs.  
 
The restrictive and exclusionary merits of EU visa policy come at many fronts and derive 
from many tools, both legal and political. Regulations and other legally binding measures 
are adopted at EU level and bind the Member States on the one hand. On the other, 
political statements and official communications touching upon entry, asylum and visas are 
conveyed and voiced at local, regional and international level. The role of EU visa policy 
and its potential is presented in the following chapter. Political statements related to the 
policy field and its potential to facilitate the entry of asylum seekers into the territory of the 
Union are also addressed.  
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4.  The Role of EU Visa Policy: Protecting or Exposing Refugees? 
 
More often than not, asylum seekers aspiring to reach Europe are subject to the visa 
requirement in order to enter the Schengen Area legally by virtue of the Visa Regulation 
and its Annexes as discussed above. There are no additional means of gaining legal access 
to the Area for a person who qualifies for refugee status or expresses a wish to apply for 
asylum. What follows is that the responsible asylum seeker will have to, like all other 
migrants from a third country whose citizens have to be in possession of a visa to cross the 
external borders of the EU, successfully apply for a visa from a Schengen Member State 
embassy or consulate. The remaining option is to resort to irregular means and attempting 
to cross the external borders as a clandestine migrant, in which case the risks borne may 
very well outweigh the benefits; premature death and serious risk thereof are not 
uncommon phenomena when considering voyage across the Mediterranean Sea, long hikes 
in the scorched deserts of Africa and hazardous land routes from Eurasia into Southern 
Europe.  
 
This chapter considers the downside of the rigidity of current visa policies as covered by 
the media as well as the potential scope that EU visa policy could have in facilitating the 
safe passage of refugees and asylum seekers into the area of the Union. Measures adopted 
under EU visa policy and their usages may be both structural as well as reactive, both 
being preventive measures by nature. This is discussed below after an overview of the 
discourse and reactions in media and among top politicians regarding the lack of legal 
means to cross the external borders.  
 
 
4.1 Discourse and Pretext 
 
In February 2014, at least 15 migrants drowned in the early days of the month where 
hundreds took it upon themselves to reach Spanish Ceuta from Morocco. Over 360 people 
were reported dead in the aftermath of the tragic incident near the coast of Lampedusa in 
October 2013.86 A group of 32 women and 48 children along with 12 men in their perilous 
journey across the Sahara from Niger to Algeria were found dead near the border of the                                                         
86 See e.g. ‘The Migrants' Files: surveying migrants' deaths at Europe's door’, EUObserver, March 31, 2014, 
available at <http://euobserver.com/investigations/123682> (accessed May 13, 2014). 
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two countries, again in October 2013.87 In late March 2011, only 11 out of a total of 72 
passengers on a boat heading toward the Italian coasts made it to land after having being 
left to drift for 16 days after the alleged discovery by European authorities that the vessel 
was in distress. The out-of-oil boat drifted with the currents into Libyan territories and the 
passengers never made it to European soil. Libyan authorities detained the survivors.88 
These are but a glimpse of the gloomy reality of migration deaths connected to the quest to 
Europe. In fact, a report in 2013 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants found that more than 16,000 people are known to have died trying to reach the 
borders of the EU between 1998 and 2012.89 The finding should be construed as a rather 
conservative one, seeing as unreported deaths are not taken into account. Furthermore, e.g. 
Weber and Pickering argue that the process of border-related deaths is a political act 
through which deaths may be denied or obscured by governments90.  
 
On Wednesday, October 16 2013, in the wake of the most devastating Lampedusa tragedy, 
demonstrators marched against EU immigration policy and EU external border policy in 
the streets of Helsinki, Finland. The various organisations that partook in the 
demonstration proclaimed that the recent deaths in the Mediterranean are directly 
attributable to EU policies, above all to the lack of sufficient legal means for the distressed 
migrants for crossing the external borders of the Union.91 On the same day, Director 
General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), William Lacy Swing, 
called on the international community ‘…to develop a more comprehensive approach to 
protect migrants and uphold human dignity’92. What is meant by comprehensive approach 
in this regard is that no action on its own is adequate to deal with this sensitive and 
significant issue. IOM suggests tangible efforts in this regard vis-à-vis migrants and 
relevant countries, that is, countries of origin, transit and destination.                                                          
87 A. Hirsch, ‘Niger migrants died from thirst, after stranding in Sahara desert’, The Guardian, October 31, 
2013, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/31/niger-migrants-found-dead-sahara-
desert> (accessed May 13, 2014). 
88 J. Shenker, ‘Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants’, The Guardian, May 8, 2011, available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-
migrants?guni=Article:in%20body%20link> (accessed May 13, 2014). 
89 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau’, United Nations, 
April 24, 2013.   
90 L. Weber and S. Pickering, Globalization and Borders – Death at the Global Frontier (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 67-69.  
91 ‘EU:n rajapolitiikkaa vastaan marsittiin Helsingissä – video’, Yle Uutiset, October 16, 2013, available at 
<http://yle.fi/uutiset/eun_rajapolitiikkaa_vastaan_marssittiin_helsingissa_-_video/6885326> (accessed May 
13, 2014). 
92 ‘IOM Director General Calls for Urgent Action to Save the Lives of Migrants Arriving by Sea in Europe’, 
International Organization for Migration, October 16, 2013. 
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In a meeting of EU leaders following the events in Lampedusa, Martin Schulz, President of 
the European Parliament stated that ‘Europe can neither save nor welcome the whole 
world.’93 He has, however, recently called for the enhancement of legal avenues for 
migration for those seeking better opportunities in Europe. European Commissioner for 
Home Affairs, Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, in a press conference told media 
representatives that that the EU needs to create ‘safer … legal ways’ for refugees to enter 
the Union94. In September 2013, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group 
(ALDE) in a press release called for the facilitation of temporary access to the EU for 
those fleeing the conflict in Syria95. Other politicians have voiced their expression for a 
need to share among Member States the so-called burden generated by mixed flows of 
migrants in accordance with solidarity within the Union.  
 
Italian politician, Simona Bonafe, in mid-May 2014 appealed to the European Union that 
Italy could not continue to deal with the humanitarian emergency alone. The Democratic 
Party representative was referring to the capsize of a boat carrying up to 400 migrants in 
the Mediterranean96. In the aftermath of the event, the Italian government accused the EU 
of not succeeding in doing enough to control and manage the flow of migrants entering 
Europe via the Mediterranean.97 Italian minister for the interior was quoted as saying ‘The 
Mediterranean is not an Italian border but a European border’98. He also warned EU 
leaders that Italy would start letting those with the right to asylum cross the Italian border 
into other European countries. Other Italian politicians have voiced their criticisms and 
advocated for a change to the Dublin rules that currently require asylum seekers to apply 
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9, 2013, available at <http://world.time.com/2013/12/09/can-europe-stop-the-mediterranean-from-turning-
into-a-graveyard/> (accessed May 13, 2014). 
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2013, available at <http://euobserver.com/justice/121712> (accessed May 13, 2014). 
95 ‘Europe urgently needs to convene a humanitarian Conference on Syrian refugee crisis’, Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group, Press Release, September 12, 2013, available at 
<http://www.alde.eu/press/press-and-release-news/press-release/article/europe-urgently-needs-to-convene-a-
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96 See e.g. N. Squires, ‘Dozens of Migrants die off Libya Coast on Boat Heading for Europe’, The Telegraph, 
May 12, 2014, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/10825336/Dozens-of-
migrants-die-off-Libya-coast-on-boat-heading-for-Europe.html> (accessed May 15, 2014). 
97 ‘Migrants Drown as Libya Boat to Italy Sinks’, BBC News, May 12, 2014, available at 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27379493> (accessed May 15, 2014). 
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for asylum and remain in the country in which they first arrived.99 Concerns over being left 
alone to deal with the highly controversial and burdening issue in this regard are not 
without foundation. 
 
On May 15 2014, Commissioner Malmström, in a statement to The Independent referring 
to the situation in the Mediterranean, asked the seemingly hypothetical question ‘Why do 
people embark on those boats?’ ‘Because there are no legal ways to get to Europe’, she 
continued.100 However, a month later in an interview with The Wall Street Journal101 she 
mentioned ‘humanitarian visas’ as a potential way of facilitating protected entry of 
migrants. In fact, the notion of the humanitarian visa was brought up already in the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
work of the Task Force Mediterranean102. The document only superficially touches upon 
the humanitarian visa or any other reinforcement of legal ways to access Europe. The 
majority of the document is dedicated to enhancing border security and tackling illegal 
migration. In the context of visas, the document merely states that the Commission will 
explore further possibilities for protected entry in the EU and that these could include 
guidelines on a common approach to humanitarian permits/visas103. In a panel organised 
by the Finnish Refugee Council, representatives of all parties in Parliament supported the 
idea of issuing humanitarian visas for the safe passage of asylum seekers to exercise their 
rights of applying for asylum104. If all national parties endorse the idea, then why not issue 
these humanitarian visas? According to the Chairwoman of the Left Youth of Finland the 
reason for this is the negative attitudinal climate regarding refugee issues, which makes it 
difficult to address to topic on a political level105. Commissioner Malmström again in July 
2014 in a press conference on asylum issues referred to the notion of humanitarian visas                                                         
99 ‘Italy Warns EU after Latest Migrant Tragedy’, Euronews, May 13, 2014, available at 
<http://www.euronews.com/2014/05/13/italy-warns-eu-after-latest-migrant-tragedy/> (accessed May 15, 
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but also mentioned that Member States were not too keen on the idea106. It would in my 
opinion be reasonable to suspect that she was referring to the Member States other than 
those directly affected by the mass influx of mixed flows of migrants. It would in that case 
be correct to assume that true solidarity and willingness to share the burden in the Union is 
lacking. 
 
Burden sharing is often brought up in political discourse at the EU level with regard to 
irregular migration and asylum seekers. Due to geographic realities, it is no coincidence 
that Member States in the south, namely Italy, Greece, Spain and Malta, are in most cases 
the first destinations in the EU for irregular migrants. Should there be a concerted and 
harmonised approach to issuing visas for the purpose of entry the burden could be shared 
by all Member States according to capacity. In such circumstances, the persons initially 
screened as qualifying for international or subsidiary protection would be granted legal 
means of entry into the EU and so the clandestine voyage to the already burdened Member 
States bordering the contemporarily affected zone would be avoided. The matter is of 
course highly controversial and is yet to be resolved. There have, however, arisen 
proposals on how to arrange access for asylum seekers into the EU without resorting to 
irregular methods. For instance the suggestion put forward by the Red Cross presented 
below would also have the effect of relieving undue burden and pressure from the national 
migration authorities of Member States in the south as asylum seekers could apply to any 
Member State. 
 
In its Position paper107, the Red Cross gives the EU a set of recommendations with the help 
of which the EU could better respect its international obligations under the various sources 
of law and to ensure safe and effective legal avenues for migrants to enter the EU and gain 
access to international protection. Recommendation 6 of the document is for current 
purposes most relevant: 
 
‘6. Allow for exemptions from EU visa regulations and promote the issuing of 
Humanitarian and Protection Visa.                                                         
106 European Asylum Support Office, 2013 Annual Report on the Situation on Asylum in the EU, press 
conference, July 7, 2014, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I090916> 
(accessed July 7, 2014). 
107 ‘Legal Avenues to Access International Protection in the EU’, Red Cross, February 27, 2013, available at 
<http://redcross.eu/en/upload/documents/pdf/2012/Migration/Position%20Paper_Legal%20Avenues_RCEU
_27.02.2013.pdf> (accessed May 13, 2013). 
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Visa obligations should be suspended for nationals and residents of countries in 
a significant humanitarian crisis and where there are no opportunities for 
issuing visas within the country of origin, as in the case of Syria at the moment. 
The issuing of humanitarian visas should be promoted in line with the 
Schengen Borders Code and the Visa Code. The EU should consider 
exempting from EU visa regulations refugees who are formally recognised by 
UNHCR and whose protection needs cannot be fully covered in their country 
of residence or are in situation of protracted displacement. Their legal entry for 
the purpose of lodging an asylum application in a Member State should be 
facilitated. Third countries which lack an appropriate asylum system should be 
encouraged to enable UNHCR to perform the refugee status determination in 
their territories.’108 
 
Reference is also made to the provision of the Visa Code regarding visas with limited 
territorial validity in the footnotes of the recommendation. This type of visa is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.  
 
However, the course of action is not always concerted nor commended. In an informal 
meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, António Guterres said, ‘The EU has in the past urged Turkey to keep its borders 
open to Syrians wishing to seek asylum, while at the same time focusing resources on 
controlling irregular entry at its own external frontiers.’109 Along these lines is the EU 
Action on Migratory Pressure – A Strategic Response110, where focus lies in preventing 
illegal migration e.g. through increased operational cooperation with third countries. The 
document makes direct reference as a strategic priority area to the better tackling of abuse 
of legal migration channels and in particular unfounded asylum applications upon visa 
liberalisation and over-stayers. As a specific tool to cater for the occasion, the paper turns 
to the Visa Regulation and the then not yet existing safeguard clause111. With regard to the 
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management of external borders, Frontex112 has in the past 8 years concluded working 
arrangements with a variety of countries on the African continent. These working 
arrangements entered into between Frontex and third country authorities with border 
security functions are not, as it were, legally binding international treaties, but rather they 
convey a political and even technical commitment to advance mutual cooperation – 
cooperation that is rarely welcomed without criticism in civic society.113 These are but the 
tip of the iceberg when considering the measures that securitize the policy area further. 
Indeed, little if any of the policy documents since the Treaty of Amsterdam actually make 
reference to the facilitation of access for asylum seekers to the territory of the Union. 
 
On a general reading it would appear that when it comes to EU immigration and external 
border policies, combating illegal migration enjoys a more significant standing at the 
expense of enhancing protection of vulnerable refugees. Under normal conditions political 
discourse as manifested in both documentation and statements uttered in press conferences 
still invokes the vocabulary of national interest, sovereignty and, of course, security. Public 
discourse on the subject tends to side with the humane angle in the wake of fatal tragedy, 
calling on decision-makers at national, regional and international level to take initiative 
and solve the problem, often referring to the increasing of legal means of entry. Perhaps, 
what should be realised, citing IOM Director General Swing, is that migration ‘…is a 
process to be managed and not a problem to be solved.’114 
 
 
4.2 From Conflict to Movement – From Structural to Reactive Prevention 
 
According to UNHCR, by the end of 2012, 45.2 million persons were coercively displaced. 
Of these, over 15 million were refugees of which over 80% are hosted by developing 
countries. Germany is the only Schengen Member State making it to the top 5 list of 
refugee-hosting countries. The high number of displaced persons is attributable to 
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persecution, conflict, severe violence and human rights violations.115 In fact, 55% of all 
refugees today hail from five countries affected and torn by war116. Furthermore, economic 
distress, social conflict, political turmoil, man-made and natural disasters, labour market 
demands, climate change and public and private works projects similarly contribute to the 
growing number of displaced persons, irregular migrants and asylum-seekers.117 Indeed the 
Joint Africa European Union Strategy Action Plan118 section on migration, mobility and 
employment highlights the need to better manage legal migration between the two 
continents as well as the importance of addressing the root causes of migration and refugee 
flows. The Action Plan, however, only refers to facilitating mobility for commercial, 
professional and study reasons in connection to visa issues119. Visa policy is not explicitly 
dealt with as a means of controlling refugee flows. It is nonetheless clear that root causes, 
such as the ones classified above, have the full attention of EU and government officials 
when it comes to migration policy. In the following, I argue that visa policy could be 
employed to affect the course and development of those root causes in addition to being a 
sound means of identifying early warning signs.  
 
As it is established that extraordinary circumstances such as emergencies and armed 
conflicts are main causes of irregular migration, there is worth in investigating the root 
causes of such undesirable events. The sociological and economic impacts of various root 
causes are not the focus of this thesis nor can they be studied in depth due to other 
limitations. Nonetheless, the hostility or other emergence stemming from the social and 
economic structures of societies120 are relevant when considering the potential and power 
of the structural preventive limb of visa policy. 
 
                                                        
115 UNHCR, Global Trends 2012: Displacement – The New 21st Century Challenge (Geneva: United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2013).  
116 Ibid. By the end of 2013, the five countries were Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  
117 Ibid 115.  
118 Joint Africa European Union Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dpap/dv/jeas_action_plan_/jeas_action_pla
n_en.pdf> (accessed June 17, 2014).  
119 Ibid, p. 62. 
120 It should also be noted that some critics have questioned the causal link between inequality and conflict. 
See e.g. A. Bellamy, ‘Realizing the Responsibility to Protect’, 10 International Studies Perspectives 2 
(2009), 111-128. 
  43 
When it comes to early warnings and first indicators of progressing conflicts, the forced 
movement of people is undoubtedly at the top.121 This suggests a rather unambiguous 
correspondence between conflict and movement. Furthermore, displaced persons, asylum 
seekers and refugees are best equipped to communicate to the international community the 
realities of the emergency and to help recognise when a conflict may or may not develop 
into genocide or other crimes against humanity. This is especially so seeing as the 
definition of a refugee focuses on various grounds of persecution.122 However, a study of 
the trends in the situation of asylum seekers in a time where the West is resorting to more 
and more advanced and innovative means of refusing entry for the purpose of seeking 
asylum, those fleeing from potential persecution and victimisation are less likely to cross 
borders in general. This has led on the one hand to a decrease in refugee numbers globally 
and an increase in the number of internally displaced persons.123 Obtaining a visa is 
practically the only way for a third country national on the negative visa list to enter the 
Schengen Area legally. That is of course unless she has a valid residence permit. Being 
eligible for a visa, as discussed above, may prove extremely challenging for members of 
certain social strata, especially during times of emergency and armed conflict – the very 
reason they now aspire to seek safe haven. It would be beneficial for the international 
community, should the first wave of asylum seekers fleeing a given conflict reach safety in 
a timely manner and give an honest account of the events back home in a truthful and open 
manner. These accounts of events, or early warnings, are less likely to come to daylight 
when the persons fleeing persecution are considered illegal migrants in their new host 
state, if they ever survive the clandestine journey. The visa has the enabling faculties of 
removing its holder from harm’s way into safety. From this notion I draw the association 
to the preventive characteristics of visa policy.  
 
Visa policy as a tool can be employed as a structural preventive mechanism. What this 
means, is that the issuance of visas may be coordinated and implemented in such a way as 
to constitute general prevention or a form of control policy action, which may or may not 
have the effect of influencing behaviour. The rhetoric behind the argument for structural  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(accessed June 18, 2014). 
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prevention is that by thwarting the emergence of a set of structural factors that enable and 
facilitate outbreaks of conflicts and crises, the cause, too, is excised. Smart use of 
migratory measures, including the introduction of visa policy in this field, could have the 
effect of rendering certain crises moot. Similarly, structural prevention of conflicts124 
inside the Schengen Area could be realised with visa policy by impeding the establishment 
of dissociated echelons of migrants into ghettos in only those Member States that 
neighbour the source countries125. Instead, migrants could be allocated between Member 
States according to their respective capacities in hosting them rather than confining 
migrants into densely populated districts in a few towns that are wholly separate from the 
rest of the populace. In fact, a considerable role of visa policy in this could be the potential 
to allocate bona fide asylum seekers and refugees among Member States. This notion of 
burden sharing is often highlighted in media discourse126 perhaps for a legitimate reason, 
too.  
 
Secondly visa policy can be executed as a reactive preventive instrument. Safe to say, 
however, this mode of prevention does not obstruct the emergence of the root causes of 
crises but instead has the ability to prevent the potential bona fide applicants from falling 
victim to persecution, genocide or other atrocity. Thus it operates as an external reaction to 
the outbreak of emergencies simultaneously facilitating Member States to live up to their 
international obligations toward those in despair. Issuing humanitarian visas for persons 
likely to be persecuted for reasons of e.g. ethnicity or faith before the actual 
commencement of genocide or other atrocity is by definition preventive. This course of 
action is not in fact unprecedented. Kaunas-based Japanese diplomat, Chiune Sugihara, 
issued visas eventually facilitating the safe passage of more than 6,000 Jews to Japan in 
1940127. The prevalent problem of taking this approach to visa policy as a tool in 
protecting bona fide asylum seekers and refugees is that it would necessarily insist on a 
preliminary ruling by the consular officer on the merits of the case i.e. the honesty, 
sincerity and eligibility of the applicant for refugee status or other protection. However, 
without prejudice to the aforementioned, the consular officer will nonetheless have to 
assess the merits of each individual visa applicant on whether or not he or she fulfils the 
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criteria laid out in the Visa Code. This applies equally when evaluating the grounds for 
issuing a so-called humanitarian visa, or a visa with limited territorial validity. 
 
 
4.3 Role of EU Visa Policy: Conclusions  
EU visa policy is exclusive. Others may even maintain that it constitutes a form of 
structural violence that on its face renders certain groups of people wholly incapable of 
entering the territory legally128. Visa policy can also be held to a certain extent accountable 
for the increasing border-related deaths. The policy area is highly politicised and often 
controversial in that it rather divides than unites people back at home. It is without a doubt 
clear, however, that the power of visa policy is two-sided. It has the power to exclude, but 
also the power to admit. Visas are not intrinsically broken or bad, yet perhaps misapplied 
in the case of asylum seekers and those fleeing persecution. Visas have the potential to 
remove people from conflict areas without forcing those people to resort to rickety boats 
and abusive traffickers. It would moreover appear from political discourse at the top level 
as well as the outcries from third country nationals, Union citizens and civic society in 
general that there truly is a need for a visa that could save human lives. The so-called 
humanitarian visa, or visa with limited territorial validity, which can be issued even when 
the entry requirements are not met, is discussed in depth in the next chapter.   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5.  Visa with Limited Territorial Validity 
 
There exist a myriad of barriers to entry vis-à-vis the visa requirement. Principally, 
requirements representing major barriers set by the Visa Code concern travel medical 
insurance, visa fees, travel documents, prior consultations, insufficient guarantees to 
justice in terms of appeal, supporting documents, any prior ‘Schengen history’ the 
applicant may have and lack of access to a competent consulate. This chapter presents and 
analyses the notion of the humanitarian visa as regulated by the Visa Code. The chapter 
begins with a brief overview of the visa with limited territorial validity and its history and 
entry into force. Certain findings based on answers to my questionnaires are presented in 
this chapter. Statistics and analysis of those figures are also considered.  
 
Common Schengen visas are intended to entitle the holder to short-term stay. The 
persecuted person seeking refuge by applying for a visa from a Schengen consulate will 
find no solace in the fact that further to long list of preconditions, visas are structurally 
inappropriate to the occasion. The legal instrument is not constructed for the purpose of 
entering the Schengen Area in order to apply for asylum or secondary protection. In fact, 
this is one frequently used reason for refusing a visa, which will be communicated to the 
applicant in a standard form129. It is even conceivable that all of the reasons stated in the 
standard form can be referred to in the case of a suspicion of the applicant being an asylum 
seeker.130 Then again, Article 12 of the Dublin III Regulation131 makes direct reference to 
                                                        
129 Visa Code, Annex VI. 
130 1. a false/counterfeit/forged travel document was presented; 
2. justification for the purpose and conditions of the intended stay was not provided; 
3. you have not provided proof of sufficient means of subsistence, for the duration of the intended stay or for 
the return to the country of origin or residence, or for the transit to a third country into which you are certain 
to be admitted, or you are not in a position to acquire such means lawfully; 
4. you have already stayed for three months during the current six-month period on the territory of the 
Member States on the basis of a uniform visa or a visa with limited territorial validity; 
5. an alert has been issued in the Schengen Information System (SIS) for the purpose of refusing entry by 
(indication of Member State); 
6. one or more Member State(s) consider you to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health as 
defined in Article 2(19) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 (Schengen Borders Code) or the international 
relations of one or more of the Member States); 
7. proof of holding an adequate and valid travel medical insurance was not provided; 
8. the information submitted regarding the justification for the purpose and conditions of the intended stay 
was not reliable; 
9. your intention to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa could not be 
ascertained. 
131 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
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being in possession of a visa for determining the competent Member State responsible for 
examining an application of international protection. However, the Visa Code introduces 
albeit not a novel type of visa but nonetheless a fresh and partially standardized type of 
visa, which we call upon to enable the legal entry of the person who seeks asylum.  
 
A visa with limited territorial validity is a visa, which is valid for the territory of one or 
more Member States but not all Member States.132 This type of visa can be issued even 
when the applicant does not fulfil the entry requirements stipulated in the Schengen 
Borders Code133. The individual effects and implications that these conditions for entry 
pose to the asylum seeker are dealt with in more detail above in chapter 3.  
 
 
5.1 Background and Theoretical Framework 
 
Prior to the EU Visa Code, provisions concerning visas with limited territorial validity 
(VLTV) were split between various articles in multiple legal instruments. The issuance of 
VLTVs was previously regulated by Articles 11(2), 14(1) and 16 of the Schengen 
Convention and Part V, 3 and Annex 14 of the Common Consular Instructions134. Misuse, 
uncertainty and varying practices as between Member States in the issuance of VLTVs 
were widespread135. The scattered provisions were for the first time gathered into one 
distinct article and integrated into the Visa Code.136 However, the Commission in the 
course of replying to queries by a number of Member States stated that the VLTV is not 
fully intended to constitute a uniform visa.137 The initial text of the draft proposal and the 
final adopted article of the Visa Code vary slightly. It is however important to note that 
substance-wise the two texts coincide for the most part. This is an important point to make 
when considering the travaux préparatoires and statements given pursuant to the adoption 
                                                                                                                                                                       
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast). 
132 Visa Code, Art. 2(4). 
133 Schengen Borders Code, Art. 5(1)(a), Art. 5(1)(b), Art. 5(1)(c), Art. 5(1)(d), Art. 5(1)(e).  
134 Common Consular Instructions on Visas for the Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts (2002/C 
313/01).  
135 Draft proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community 
Code on Visas, 11752/06, July 24, 2006. 
136 COM(2006) 403 final/2. 
137 Valtioneuvoston kirjelmä Eduskunnalle ehdotuksesta Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetukseksi 
yhteisön viisumisäännöstöksi (viisumisäännöstö) (U 52/2008 vp). 
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of the Visa Code and when assessing the relevancy of those statements to the final adopted 
text.138  
 
The substance of the provision remains by and large the same; mostly only editorial 
changes have ended up in the adopted text. The main substantial change is in the 
specification of the competent actor. In the proposal reference is made to diplomatic 
missions and consular posts while the adopted text refers to the Member State concerned. 
This change most likely reflects the differences in practices between Member States and 
how they have organised their visa-issuing operations. In some cases it may be the central 
authority located inside the Member State who actually takes the decision on the visa 
application while in others it would be the diplomatic mission or consular post located 
within the third country that takes an independent decision possibly having consulted with 
the central authority back home.139 The Commission in its most recent proposal amending 
the existing Visa Code does not intend to amend Article 25 on VLTVs.  
 
The initial proposal by the Commission contained a provision waiving the visa fee in cases 
where the holder of a VLTV would need to travel to a Member State not included in the 
territorial validity of the VLTV and a second visa application would have to be lodged.140 
This provision would have proved particularly refugee-friendly when one Member State 
issues a visa only valid for travel into that state, but there were no direct flights from the 
country of origin and the transfer would take place in another Schengen Member State. 
However, the provision did not survive unchanged in the final version. The adopted text 
                                                        
138 Point (b) in Art. 25(1) was originally adopted as ‘(b) when for reasons deemed justified by the consulate, a 
new visa is issued for a stay during the same six-month period to an applicant who, over this six-month 
period, has already used a uniform visa or a visa with limited territorial validity allowing for a stay of three 
months’ (emphasis added). The reference to time periods was amended from months to days in Regulation 
(EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 amending  
(EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement, Council Regulations (EC) No 1683/95 and (EC) No 539/2001 and 
Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
139 Even though Art. 4(1) Visa Code provides that applications shall be examined and decided on by 
consulates; paragraph 4 enables the involvement of other authorities. In Sweden, for example, decisions on 
visa applications are taken by the central authority in Sweden, Migrationsverket (The Migration Board). 
140 COM(2006) 403 final/2, Art. 16(7): ‘When the holder of an LTV issued in accordance with Article 
21(1)(c) needs to travel – within the period of validity of that visa – to a Member State not included in the 
territorial validity of the LTV, no handling fee shall be charged for the processing of the second visa 
application.’ 
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includes a similar but not as compelling provision for waiving the visa fee for 
humanitarian reasons141. 
 
An interesting feature in paragraph 1 is that the wording used is ‘shall be issued’ instead of 
‘may be issued’. The adopted phrasing employed suggests non-discretion. The word ‘shall’ 
is used widely in EU legislation and implies a mandatory nature to undertake to do a 
prescribed act or to refrain from doing so. Also the fact that during the Visa Working Party 
meetings between 2007 and 2008 there were vibrant discussions on the wording of the 
VLTV Article suggests that this particular issue was to some extent sensitive. It was 
indicated that the Benelux states could be treated as a single entity for the purpose of this 
individual Article.142 Proposals were also made for the employment of ‘may be issued’ in 
the text of the article. The communication from the Finnish Government to the 
Parliament143 on the draft proposal for a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) further 
seems to place emphasis on the wording. It states that Article 21(1) of the draft proposal 
(now Article 25(1)) sets out the individual cases where a visa with limited territorial 
validity has to be issued144. There is, however, what I call a ‘two-fold test’, which vitiates 
the obligatory nature of the provision.  
 
 
5.2 Two-Fold Test and Discretion 
 
A visa with limited territorial validity shall be issued for our purposes when the Member 
State concerned considers it necessary for reasons of national interest, humanitarian 
grounds or because of international obligations to derogate from the entry conditions laid 
out in the Schengen Borders Code or to issue a visa despite an objection by a Member 
State consulted to the issuing of a uniform Schengen visa. The two-fold test constructed 
into Article 25(1) requires in the first place that there is a reason of national interest, 
humanitarian grounds or international obligations that the visa should be issued 
exceptionally. Secondly, the VLTV shall only be issued if the Member State concerned                                                         
141 Visa Code, Art. 16(6): ‘In individual cases, the amount of the visa fee to be charged may be waived or 
reduced when to do so serves to promote cultural or sporting interests as well as interests in the field of 
foreign policy, development policy and other areas of vital public interest or for humanitarian reasons’ 
[emphasis added]. 
142 Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Passports and Visas, dated July 26, 2013. 
143 COM(2006) 403 final/2. 
144 Ibid 137, ‘Artiklan 1 kohdassa luetellaan yksityiskohtaisesti tapaukset, joissa on myönnettävä 
kelpoisuusalueeltaan rajoitettu viisumi’ [emphasis added]. 
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considers it necessary. The handed down margin of appreciation as regards what it is that 
constitutes necessity is unclear and the regulation does not offer any guidance on the 
correct application or reading of the provision. Nor does the draft proposal. Discretion as 
regards the issuance of a visa when the entry conditions are met was considered in the 
Koushkaki case145. The German Federal Republic had sent a request for a preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union asking whether the competent 
authorities of a Member State can refuse to issue a uniform visa to an applicant who 
satisfies the entry conditions referred to in current Article 21(1) of the Visa Code. The 
Advocate-General argued that there was in fact no right to a common Schengen visa. The 
court disagreed and stated:  
 
‘It follows … that the competent authorities set out in Article 4(1) to (4) of the 
Visa Code cannot refuse to issue a uniform visa unless one of the grounds for 
refusal listed in Articles 32(1) and 35(6) of that code can be applied to the 
applicant.’146  
 
The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Koushkaki can be 
argued to be applicable by analogy to other types of visa, too. This would give the 
impression that the issuance of VLTVs does not in fact enjoy an unfettered discretion. 
However, the Commission, as pointed out above, had indeed stated that the VLTV is not 
intended to fully constitute a uniform visa147. The aim and formulation of the two articles 
are also different. The potential applicability of Koushkaki by way of analogy to the 
discretion of the issuance of VLTVs is therefore uncertain. The CJEU referred to the list of 
grounds for denying a visa as exhaustive. This was the reasoning behind finding that once 
the conditions for a visa are met; the visa is to be issued. However, the CJEU also made 
note that the authorities responsible for assessing the relevant facts in order to determine 
whether the grounds for refusal are present have a wide discretion when doing so148. 
 
To maintain that asylum seekers have a right to be issued VLTVs pursuant to Koushkaki is 
flawed. This is especially so as the grounds for refusal of a visa do indeed apply to the 
potential asylum seeker. One ground for refusal above all is that ‘the applicant does not                                                         
145 Case C-84/12, Rahmanian Koushkaki v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, December 19, 2013. 
146 Ibid at 65. 
147 Ibid 137.  
148 Ibid 145 at 60. 
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intend to leave the territory within the validity period of the visa’149. Steve Peers argues 
that Member States applying the Visa Code could in fact have an obligation to issue 
potential asylum seekers a VLTV, provided that the Member State in question complied 
with its international obligations as also entrenched by EU law. The asylum seeker would 
of course need to be dishonest, as he or she does not indeed intend to leave the territory 
within the validity period of the visa. However, this would not pose a major problem 
seeing as Article 31 of the Refugee Convention justifies breaches of national immigration 
laws for the purpose of fleeing persecution. According to Peers, because of the 
international obligations vis-à-vis the protection of persons fleeing persecution coupled 
with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the word ‘shall’ in Article 25 of the Visa 
Code overrides the discretion granted by the same article in the words ‘when the Member 
State concerned considers it necessary’ [emphasis added].150 This, I argue, is something 
that would have to be settled by the CJEU. 
 
Koushkaki gives us some idea about the extent of discretion handed down by the Visa 
Code in terms of issuing a visa. In its response151 to my questionnaire, the German Federal 
Foreign Office stated that it does not possess the necessary information to assess the extent 
of discretion they regard as properly vesting with the competent authorities for processing 
visa applications. The Embassy of Finland in Tehran in its response152 to the questionnaire 
noted that in cases of possible VLTV issuance, the central authority – the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit or Passports and Visas – is consulted for the determination 
of the discretion. In fact, in each individual case where a Finnish consular officer is 
considering issuing a VLTV, the central authority is consulted. The Embassy of Finland in 
New Delhi in its response153 considered the extent of discretion bestowed upon consular 
officers by the Visa Code regarding the issuance of a VLTV as a rather broad one. This 
presumption is in line with Koushkaki.  
 
The VLTV appears to enjoy a special standing and does not compare to a uniform common 
Schengen visa when it comes to the conditions for issuing one. On the other hand, Peers                                                         
149 Visa Code, Annex XI, point 9. 
150 See e.g. S. Peers, ‘Do Potential Asylum Seekers have the Right to a Schengen Visa?’, EU Law Analysis, 
January 20, 2014, available at <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.fi/2014/01/do-potential-asylum-seekers-have-
right.html> (accessed June 24, 2014).  
151 Letter from the German Federal Foreign Office, Optimising the visa procedure, Management consultation 
for visa sections, Schengen representation agreements and cooperation unit, dated April 11, 2014. 
152 Letter from the Embassy of Finland in Tehran, Iran, dated March 24, 2014.  
153 Letter from the Embassy of Finland in New Delhi, India, dated April 1, 2014.  
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maintains that in a case involving the need for international protection and where that need 
is brought to the attention of the visa officer, the visa officer must take this into account by 
virtue of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.154 There is currently no separate outlet or 
channel for applying for a VLTV; the same standard visa application is used as for a 
common Schengen visa. However, the International Foundation for the Protection of 
Human Rights Defenders in their general information form155 regarding visas for human 
rights defenders makes special note of the possibility of applying for a VLTV and even 
advocates trying to apply for one.  It would be interesting to see an applicant challenge the 
Member State on the basis of Article 25 in order to clarify the question concerning 
Member State discretion in its determinations about necessity and the nexus between 
necessity and international obligations of the state concerned. 
 
 
5.3 Reasons for Issuing a Visa with Limited Territorial Validity 
 
The grounds for issuing a VLTV are listed in Article 25 of the Visa Code. The reasons for 
our purpose comprise the following: the applicant does not satisfy the entry conditions laid 
down in Article 5(1)(a), (c), (d) and (e) of the Schengen Borders Code; one or more 
Member States have objected in accordance with Article 22 of the Visa Code; and due to 
reasons of urgency, prior consultation required under Article 22 has not been carried out. 
Another reason for issuing a VLTV is that the third country national applicant holds a 
travel document that is not recognised by one or more, but not all Member States. This 
situation arises often in case of non-regular passports such as special passports or service 
passports issued by certain third country authorities or entities. The Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland and certain Finnish Embassies were kind enough to respond to the 
questionnaires I sent out regarding the issuance of VLTVs in the respective third countries. 
The German Federal Foreign Office was content in stating that as they do not disaggregate 
between the grounds for issuing a VLTV, it was impossible to ascertain the specific 
humanitarian reason for issuing the visa or the specific international obligation in question 
that justified the issuing of the VLTV.                                                         
154 S. Peers, ‘External Processing of Applications for International Protection in the EU’, EU Law Analysis, 
April 24, 2014, available at <http://www.ein.org.uk/blog/external-processing-applications-international-
protection-eu> (accessed June 24, 2014). 
155 ‘Schengen Visa Application Process: General Information & Tips for Human Rights Defenders at Risk’, 
The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, September, 2011, available at 
<http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/fl_schengen_visa_guidelines_0.pdf> (accessed June, 10, 2014). 
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Since the introduction of the Visa Code, Member States have been required by directly 
applicable EU law to compile annual statistics on visas in accordance with the table set out 
in Annex XII of the Visa Code156. Further to this, consulates and embassies of Member 
States in a third country are required to exchange within local Schengen cooperation 
monthly statistics on uniform visas, visas with limited territorial validity, and airport transit 
visas issued, as well as the number of visas refused157. 
 
 
5.3.1 Reasons for Issuing a VLTV: Finland 
 
Finland has exceptionally issued VLTVs mostly for humanitarian reasons when the travel 
document to which the visa is to be affixed is not recognised by one or more Member 
States. It could be Finland or any number of other Member States that do not recognise the 
travel document in question. VLTVs have in the past also been issued when a third country 
national residing in Finland has lost his/her residence permit abroad or when a third 
country national is arriving to Finland for marriage purposes. The Unit for Passports and 
Visas also indicated that in addition to the aforementioned reasons Finland has also after 
careful special consideration issued individual VLTVs for humanitarian reasons. Under the 
refugee quota, persons whom the UNHCR has designated as refugees have also been 
exceptionally issued VLTVs.158  
 
The Finnish Embassy in New Delhi issued 31 VLTVs in 2013. The main reason for issuing 
VLTVs there was not in fact related to the recognition of travel documents, as I had 
originally anticipated. The Finnish Embassy in New Delhi issued VLTVs e.g. for Afghan 
citizens whose visa applications had been submitted too late in order for the consultation 
procedure to be carried out. However, these persons have generally been either persons 
travelling on business or others known to the staff for their integrity and reliability, not 
potential asylum seekers. In such cases, the ground for issuing a VLTV is rather ‘because 
of national interest’ rather than a humanitarian one. At the time of the letter, no visas had 
                                                        
156 Visa Code, Art. 46. 
157 Visa Code, Art. 48(3)(a). 
158 Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Passports and Visas, dated July 26, 2013.  
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been issued for humanitarian reasons or because of international obligations.159 The 
Finnish Embassy in Tehran echoed with most what the Finnish Embassy in New Delhi 
submitted. They, too, had issued humanitarian visas for reasons pertaining to the 
consultation procedure and also when a close relative of the visa applicant had been in an 
accident in Finland.160 
 
The issue of humanitarian visas made it to the headlines when the Finnish Broadcasting 
Company (YLE) published the findings of the Finnish Refugee Council (FRC) and the 
panel on humanitarian visas organised by the latter. The FRC advocates for the issuance of 
VLTVs to ensure the safe passage of persons fleeing persecution and to enable them to 
exercise their right to apply for asylum. The motion was put forward as a response 
particularly to the situation in Syria and the growing death toll in the Mediterranean. 
However, state authorities have taken a quota approach to refugees. Under this system, 
Finland accepts persons designated as refugees or other foreigners in need of international 
protection or resettlement by UNHCR. According to the Head of the Unit for Passports and 
Visas, Päivi Blinnikka, the matter of the so-called humanitarian visa is not as simple as the 
FRC leads on. If a person is issued a VLTV, that person is merely entitled to entry into 
Finland and to apply for asylum there. This does not guarantee that he/she will in fact be 
granted asylum, secondary protection or a residence permit, she continued.161 It could also 
be argued that the fear of changing policy and to start issuing VLTVs for such purposes 
arises from the notion that should the person fail to qualify for asylum, secondary 
protection or a residence permit, returning that person could prove to be next to impossible 
owing to practical reasons. These are often related to travel documents, not to mention that 
forced deportations are expensive as well as time-consuming operations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
159 Ibid 152. 
160 Ibid 153. 
161 E. Hiltunen, ‘Järjestö: Humanitaarisesta viisumista apua pakolaisille, Yle uutiset, June 20, 2014, available 
at <http://yle.fi/uutiset/jarjesto_humanitaarisesta_viisumista_apua_pakolaisille/7260421> (accessed July 1, 
2014).  
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5.4 Statistics 
 
The Commission publishes a compilation of all visa-related information gathered by all 
visa-issuing consulates and embassies annually on its website162. The importance of 
gathering statistical data is acknowledged in Recital 19 of the regulation, recognising that 
such data enables the monitoring of migratory movements and can serve as an efficient 
management tool.  
 
As a caveat apropos the accuracy and reliability of the statistics, it should be noted that 
Member States are not under the current Visa Code obliged to record information on which 
specific ground the VLTV was issued. Consequently, the amount of VLTVs issued 
includes those issued for humanitarian reasons, because of national interests and because 
of international obligations. Not a single Member State currently disaggregates between 
the grounds for issuing a VLTV when compiling annual visa statistics, as far as the 
Commission is aware. However, the Commission head of unit dealing with visa policy, Jan 
De Ceuster, stated that the situation might change as the provisions of the Visa Code are 
being reviewed, including the ones on statistics163. Indeed the Commission proposal for a 
new Visa Code emphasises the point that the lack of sufficiently detailed statistical data 
hinders the assessment of the implementation of certain provisions. Annex VII of the 
regulation, listing the information for which statistics is to be gathered, is thus subject to be 
amended. It is proposed that the annex should provide for the collection of all relevant data 
in a sufficiently disaggregated form to allow for proper assessment. De Ceuster in his 
response from July 2013 stated that the Commission would assess whether it is necessary 
to request an additional disaggregation of the VLTV data according to the reason why the 
visa was issued. It remains to be seen whether disaggregated data on the grounds for which 
Member States have issued VLTVs will be included in the final text.   
 
 
 
                                                         
162 See the Visa statistics for 2013, European Commission Home Affairs website on Visa policy, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm> 
(accessed September 5, 2013). 
163 Response from European Commission, Head of Unit C2, DG HOME to e-mail inquiry, dated July 26, 
2013. 
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5.4.1 Data Table 
 
I assembled the subsequent table of statistics on the basis of the statistical information 
compiled by the Commission with regard to visas issued by the Member States in 2013. 
There are currently almost 2,000 Schengen embassies and consulates issuing visas 
globally. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, 44 Schengen consulates and embassies 
were chosen for an analysis of Member States’ VLTV-issuing practices. The following 
data is by no means supposed to illustrate a comprehensive account of how different 
Member States utilise VLTVs in their visa policy at a national level. Nonetheless, trends 
can be detected. The following statistics are intended to illustrate the current practices of 
various Member States in their issuance of VLTVs in relation to uniform visas. The 
consulates and embassies situated on or accredited to the territory of states confronted with 
recent conflicts and other emergencies are relevant for our purposes in determining the 
potential of the VLTV for facilitating the safe passage of vulnerable people. Therefore 
third countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Syria and Sudan are included. Visa statistics of 
more stable third countries, such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Venezuela, are 
also presented in order to help comprehend the norm when it comes about VLTVs and visa 
statistics. 
 
The information chosen for this specific table (out of 19 different columns of data and 
sorting bases) comprise the third country in question; location of consulate; Member State 
that issued the visa; total amount of Schengen visas applied for; the rate for Schengen visas 
not issued; amount of VLTVs issued; and rate for issued VLTVs of all Schengen visas 
applied for.  
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Third Country  Consulate/ Embassy 
Schengen 
Member 
State 
C Visas 
applied for 
Rate for C 
visas not 
issued (%) 
LTV 
Visas 
issued 
Rate for 
issued 
VLTVs of 
all C Visas 
applied for 
Afghanistan Kabul Germany 2,828 51.80% 54 1.91% 
Afghanistan Kabul Netherlands 183 2.70% 37 20.22% 
Afghanistan Kabul Poland 742 15.60% 214 28.84% 
Afghanistan Kabul Denmark 124 13.70% 34 27.42% 
Algeria Algiers Portugal 1,578 9.60% 115 7.29% 
Algeria Algiers France 179,833 23.20% 128 0.01% 
Algeria Algiers Switzerland 3,670 10.70% 224 6.10% 
Algeria Algiers Hungary 602 49.70% 0 0% 
Bangladesh Dhaka Italy 3,066 14.90% 344 11.22% 
Bangladesh Dhaka Sweden 3,711 21.20% 217 5.85% 
Cameroon Yaounde Italy 4,280 36.80% 179 4.18% 
Cameroon Yaounde France 10,398 22.30% 7 0.07% 
Central African 
Republic Bangui France 2,527 38.30% 16 0.63% 
Congo Brazzaville Italy 1,221 34.60% 121 9.91% 
Congo Brazzaville France 5,006 22.40% 10 0.02% 
D.R. Congo Kinshasa Italy 7,170 41.40% 3,018 42.09% 
D.R. Congo Kinshasa Switzerland 1,455 23.90% 1,036 71.21% 
Egypt Cairo Germany 24,492 9.90% 410 1.67% 
Egypt Cairo France 45,162 11.90% 5 
             
<0.01% 
Egypt Cairo Finland 897 16.40% 6 0.07% 
Eritrea Asmara Italy 1,549 34.50% 42 2.71% 
Ethiopia 
Addis 
Ababa Switzerland 1,061 17.20% 92 8.67% 
Iraq Bagdad Germany 4,776 7.50% 4,390 91.92% 
Iraq Bagdad Spain 2,284 2.00% 160 7.01% 
North Korea Pyongyang Germany 258 7.40% 2 0.08% 
Kosovo Pristina Germany 26,463 17.40% 21,629 81.73% 
Libya Tripoli Germany 3,437 14.00% 2,706 78.73% 
Mali Bamako Spain 800 29.60% 171 21.38% 
Morocco Tangier Spain 43,554 7.00% 618 1.42% 
Morocco Rabat Finland 503 21.90% 1 0.20% 
Morocco Rabat Belgium 775 0.00% 44 5.68% 
Myanmar Yangon France 1,658 3.20% 0 0% 
Nigeria Abuja Switzerland 2,850 11.10% 184 6.46% 
Russian 
Federation Moscow Spain 1,051,643 1.00% 3,991 0.40% 
Russian 
Federation 
St. 
Petersburg Finland 1,204,670 0.80% 35 
             
<0.01% 
Rwanda Kigali Germany 225 20.90% 17 7.56% 
Sri Lanka Colombo Germany 5,687 21.00% 82 1.44% 
Sudan Khartoum Italy 1,756 2.80% 1,230 70.05% 
Sudan Khartoum Spain 2,103 39.80% 168 8.00% 
Syria Damascus Poland 380 42.60% 27 7.11% 
Syria Damascus 
Czech 
Republic 15 13.30% 0 0% 
Tunisia Tunis Italy 11,055 14.10% 77 0.70% 
Ukraine Kiev Italy 63,609 1.40% 5,406 8.50% 
Venezuela Caracas Poland 74 0.00% 52 70.27% 
Image 5 – Statistics on visas with limited territorial validity. 
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5.4.2 Analysis of the Practices of Member States 
 
It is interesting to observe the differences in Member State practices when it comes to the 
issuance of VLTVs in a given third country. It should be noted that some figures are 
misleading, e.g. the high rate of VLTVs issued in Kosovo by Germany and in fact by all 
Member States, is due to the fact that not all Member States recognise the statehood of 
Kosovo164 nor the travel documents issued by the entity. Therefore visa applicants with 
Kosovar passports cannot be issued uniform Schengen visas. Again, the practically non-
existent rate of VLTVs issued in St. Petersburg by Finland can be explained be the relative 
homogeneity of visa applicants and extremely high rate of common Schengen visas and 
multiple entry visas issued there.  
 
In Damascus, Poland issued the most VLTVs of all Member States, comprising 7.11% of 
all Polish visas issued in Syria. This is not particularly high considering the dominant 
situation in Syria. Most visa-issuing consulates in Syria have however been closed and so 
Poland certainly stands out. Other Member States catch the eye as issuing great amounts of 
VLTVs in relation to the number of visa applications in conflict areas such as Italy 
(42.09%) and Switzerland (71.21%) in Kinshasa, Germany (91.92%) in Bagdad and 
(78.73%) in Tripoli, Italy (70.05%) in Khartoum and Poland (70.27%) in Caracas. It would 
in fact appear that in third countries, where the rate of common Schengen visas not issued 
is relatively high, the rate for issued VLTVs of all common Schengen visas applied for is 
low, too. This, I suggest, can perhaps be explained by the fact that high rates of refusals 
suggest a perceived risk of illegal immigration or other foul play, and this also deters the 
consular officers from issuing humanitarian visas in an overtly fashion. However, the 
contention is somewhat flawed. It is probably the ensuing conflict or other raging poor 
conditions that correlates to the high refusal rate and indeed the need for humanitarian 
visas in such circumstances. Therefore, should Member States issue VLTVs for the 
purpose of facilitating entry of those fleeing persecution into the Union, the respective 
ratio for VLTVs issued of all visas applied for should be higher in countries suffering from 
conflict or other emergency and where the refusal rate is relatively high. Two exceptions 
can be observed in the table above. Notwithstanding high refusal rates in Kinshasa, both 
Italy and Switzerland have issued an impressive amount of VLTVs. The Democratic                                                         
164 E.g. Spain has not recognised Kosovo, possibly for reasons concerning domestic policy on Basque 
country and Catalonia.  
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Republic of Congo is, as it were, one of the top refugee-producing countries today. 
However, as the grounds for issuing the VLTVs are not disaggregated in the statistics, it is 
impossible to say whether or not the two correlate or whether e.g. Italy and Switzerland 
both recognise a special type of passport issued by D.R.C., which other Member States do 
not recognise. This, too, could explain the high rate for issued VLTVs of all common visas 
applied for there.  
 
Some Member States stand out as not issuing at all or indeed very little VLTVs. France 
appears to be extremely passive in its issuance of VLTVs in general, including in third 
countries struggling with conflicts and emergencies. In Algiers, Bangui, Brazzaville, Cairo, 
Yangon and Yaounde, France issued an average rate of 0.12% VLTVs for all common 
visas applied for. The smaller Member States such as Czech Republic, Finland and 
Hungary, too, appear to be rather conservative in their VLTV-issuing practices.  
 
Looking at present conflict zones and the visa-issuing practices there, it seems fair to 
suggest that certain Member States make use of the VLTV there whilst others are 
unenthusiastic about the idea. To reiterate, due to the lack of specific statistics on the 
grounds upon which the VLTV in question was issued, it is impossible to ascertain 
whether the visa was issued for the sake of facilitating safe passage over perilous waters, 
because one or more Member States does not recognise the travel document wielded by the 
applicant, one or more Member States have objected to the issuing of a uniform visa in the 
consultation procedure or any number of other reasons. Pursuant to the possible 
amendments to the existing Visa Code regarding the gathering of statistics, it should prove 
an interesting exercise to analyse the grounds more thoroughly. This would also provide a 
better starting point to interview consular officers on the specifics of each case, e.g. due to 
which exact international obligation the VLTV was issued and for what humanitarian 
reason.  
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5.5 Humanitarian Visas: Conclusion 
 
Since the entry into force of the Visa Code in 2009 Member States have had the 
opportunity to issue visas for applicants who do not satisfy the entry conditions. Despite 
the Commission maintaining that the VLTV is not a fully uniform type of visa, EU 
politicians at the top level have called upon the undeveloped notion of humanitarian visa as 
a means to approach a common issue facing Europe. This is a political matter 
notwithstanding arguments in favour of the notion that VLTVs had to be issued for those 
fleeing persecution, following the Koushkaki ruling. Different Member States have 
adopted wholly different approaches to their policy vis-à-vis the issuance of VLTVs. It 
would be safe to assert that notwithstanding the harmonisation of visa policy at EU level, 
there exist simultaneously over twenty national visa policies on top of the overarching visa 
policy of the EU. In want of more accurate statistics on the grounds for which the VLTVs 
were issued, it is left to speculation and unofficial accounts on how each Member State 
conduct their VLTV-issuing.  
 
The challenges and opportunities for issuing VLTVs as humanitarian visas are considered 
in the next chapter. Alternative methods for guaranteeing the safe passage of asylum 
seekers out of harm’s away and for enabling them to exercise their right to apply for 
asylum are also outlined as measures, recommendations if you like, to be considered.  
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6.  Challenges, Opportunities and Recommendations 
 
The budding concept of the humanitarian visa brings with it opportunities and benefits to 
be secured but also challenges facing Member States and the integrity of the Schengen 
Area as a whole. This chapter considers the various challenges and opportunities vested in 
the notion of the humanitarian visa. Also, further responses and suggestions for 
amendments to existing legislation are contemplated in this chapter.  
 
 
6.1 VLTV: The Humane Humanitarian Visa 
 
As Member States especially in Southern Europe are feeling constantly increasing pressure 
in the capacities of their national authorities dealing with immigration and refugee matters 
such as search and rescue operations, asylum application processing, tackling trafficking in 
human beings and people smuggling and even logistical constraints when it comes to 
housing those who make it ashore, arguments in favour of the humanitarian visa come as a 
godsend. This is especially so when they are voiced at the top EU level. The programme of 
the six-month Italian presidency of the EU Council pays particular attention to the 
prevention of ‘asylum shopping’ and indeed emphasises that the Presidency will continue 
to promote genuine solidarity at European level regarding the particular pressure on the 
national asylum systems of some Member States165. A harmonised approach to 
humanitarian visa-issuing within the EU would prove beneficial for those Member States 
that are currently unreasonably burdened by the mass influx of mixed flows of migrants by 
virtue of their geographic location. A concerted policy vis-à-vis VLTVs in the framework 
of facilitating asylum seekers’ safe passage into the area of the Member States for the 
purpose of applying for asylum could help allocate those fleeing persecution among all 
Member States according to their respective capacities to host them. This could be 
achieved through the operation of the representation networks and detailed mandates for 
that representation in addition to close cooperation between Member States. Currently, 
                                                        
165 See the Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 1 July to 31 
December 2014.  
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Germany, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Italy registered 70 % of all asylum 
applicants166. The burden is borne by some more than others, as visible below.   
 
 
Image 6 – Statistics on the respective EU Member States and the top nationalities applying for asylum as well as relevant numbers. 167 
 
                                                        
166 ‘Large Increase to almost 435,000 Asylum Applicants Registered in the EU28 in 2013’, Eurostat News 
Release, March 24, 2013, available at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-24032014-
AP/EN/3-24032014-AP-EN.PDF> (accessed July 3, 2014). 
167 Ibid. 
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Schengen and other EU Member States would benefit from this type of arrangement as 
would also third countries that are hubs for organised crime syndicates engaging in 
trafficking in human beings and people smuggling. These third countries quite often tend 
to be both transit and source countries, such as Libya and Turkey. A Libyan minister 
recently threatened to assist irregular migrants to cross the Mediterranean should the EU 
fail to help his country manage the constant flow of migrants arriving into Libya from Sub-
Saharan Africa, migrants that eventually attempt at crossing the Mediterranean in 
unseaworthy vessels. The interim interior minister failed, however, to specify what help 
exactly entailed for him.168 It should nevertheless be emphatically made clear that the 
VLTV or any kind of visa policy for that matter is not meant to nor should be employed as 
a result of attempts at strong-arming the EU.  
 
The most crucial point to make in favour of issuing humanitarian visas is that it would save 
human lives, possibly in the hundreds annually. However, the effect that this policy would 
have on those that did not qualify for VLTVs would likely still be the same. They would 
still undertake to cross the Mediterranean in rickety boats, risking their lives in hope for a 
better future. The capacity of the Member States is limited notwithstanding current 
evaluations concerning the ageing populace of Europe and the nearing labour deficit. A 
sustainable solution for both the source countries and Member States alike requires 
structural undertakings, cross-administrative and far-reaching commitment to develop and 
guarantee security and safety locally. In other words, it requires solutions that eradicate the 
original root causes for mass movements of people whether it be economic instability, 
religious sectarianism, drought or any other circumstance giving rise to emergency. 
Without prejudice to the aforementioned, this does not frustrate the purpose and potential 
of the humanitarian visa as a temporary facilitator. 
 
Another obvious argument supporting the issuance of humanitarian visas is that Member 
States could truly live up to their obligations regarding the protection of refugees. Member 
States could therefore better facilitate access to international protection besides being able 
to allocate asylum seekers across the board.  
                                                         
168 ‘Libya Threatens EU over African Immigrants’, Al Jazeera, May 11, 2014, available at 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/libya-threatens-eu-over-african-immigrants-
201451151638149598.html> (accessed June 4, 2014).  
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There also exist various practical challenges when it comes to the status and actions of the 
potential asylum seeker who has been issued a VLTV. Upon entry into the issuing Member 
State, it would be safe to assume that the person would apply for asylum there. In fact, 
pursuant to Article 12 of the Dublin III Regulation the issuing Member State would have 
responsibility to process the asylum application of the person they issued the visa to. In the 
ideal situation this is exactly what would happen. However, as Päivi Blinnikka pointed out, 
the humanitarian visa is not as simple as that. Being in possession of a VLTV merely 
entitles the holder to cross the border of the issuing Member State. If the VLTV is issued 
for a period of validity of e.g. sixty days, the visa holder essentially has to submit his/her 
asylum application within that period or apply for a residence permit. Failing this, once the 
validity of the visa has expired, the person would practically become an illegal immigrant 
leaving that person into a kind of limbo status. Should the person leave the territory of the 
issuing Member State and enter into another one, the illegal person is then in violation of 
the immigration laws of that second country. Even if the person is apprehended, duly 
returned to the country that issued the visa in the first place, that first Member State may 
find itself practically impotent in the situation. The person has not applied for asylum, or 
even if he/she has and did not qualify for asylum, subsidiary protection or a residence 
permit, yet he/she cannot perhaps be expelled or returned to the country of origin due to 
the lack of a valid travel document recognised by the third country in question or any 
number of other practical reasons obstructing expulsion. Moreover, it would seem an 
unreasonable burden to bear for the Member State who in all sincerity offered to handle the 
case of an apparently bona fide asylum seeker. In such a case, the Member State in 
question may be obliged to issue the person a temporary residence permit or even 
eventually a permanent one after a number of years during which expulsion, return or 
deportation was not possible for one reason or another. The Member State must assume 
this risk and it may come at a high cost not only to the Member State and the integrity of 
the Schengen Area but also to bona fide asylum seekers and the whole institution of the 
humanitarian visa. This also raises questions about the lack of trust between Member 
States with regard to entry permits and the non-existence of internal border checks.  
 
The European Migration Network (EMN) in 2010 published an ad hoc query on the 1959 
Council of Europe Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees169. The treaty                                                         
169 European Migration Network, ‘Ad Hoc Query on 1959 Council of Europe Agreement (Treaty No. 031) on 
the Abolition of Visas for Refugees’, April 1, 2010.  
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provides that refugees residing lawfully in the area of a Contracting Party170 are exempt 
from the visa requirement to enter or leave the area of another Contracting Party. Many 
EMN Member States took part in the survey responding that they had indeed encountered 
difficulties as a result of participation in the treaty. The typical concerns related to the fact 
that a person otherwise subject to the visa requirement was already residing in the area of 
another Contracting Party lawfully yet still lodged an application for asylum or other 
permission to remain in a second Contracting Party. Similarly administrative and technical 
procedures for returns were seen as rigid. The issues outlined by the participating states 
apply comparably to the situation where individual Member States would issue VLTVs for 
purposes of asylum seeking. It could moreover lead to an unwanted phenomenon of visa 
shopping in third countries and successful applicants would settle in another Member State 
than the issuing one. However, this risk exists even in the case of regular Schengen visas. 
Indeed, Belgium brought this point out in their response noting that they had not 
experienced problems with the treaty seeing as they are a member of the Schengen Area 
and refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection residing lawfully in the Area 
having a valid travel document are entitled for visa free stay for a maximum of 90 days in 
Belgium.  
 
As mentioned above, the consular officer considering the issuance of a VLTV will 
inevitably have to make an initial judgment on the merits of the case i.e. the eligibility of 
the visa applicant for refugee status or secondary protection. This on the other hand confers 
extra duties to the official who would also require further training for this purpose. 
Consequently, this additional duty also generates more room for the consular officer to err 
in his decision. Perhaps this potential room for error is what brings a further humane 
element or at least human factor into the humanitarian visa.  
 
 
6.2 Other Possibilities to Facilitate Safe Passage 
 
There remain some further possibilities to facilitate the safe passage of asylum seekers into 
the territory of the Union, which can conveniently be linked to this thesis. Below I present                                                         
170 The European Migration Network Member States that are also Contracting Parties to the treaty are 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.  
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two ideas that could be achieved through the revision of two regulations discussed above – 
namely the Visa Regulation and the Schengen Borders Code. The following outlines the 
additional two possibilities for ensuring asylum seekers a safe entry into the Union. 
 
 
6.2.1 Exemptions from the Visa Requirement: Article 4 
 
The current Visa Regulation provides for a certain national discretion for distinct classes of 
persons for whom Member States may waive the requirement to be in possession of a visa 
to enter the area. A Member State may provide for exceptions from the visa requirement as 
regards holders of diplomatic passports, official-duty passports and other official passports 
as well as civilian air and sea crew. Similarly a Member State may waive the visa 
requirement for flight crew and attendants on emergency and rescue flights and other 
helpers in the event of disaster or accident. The article also makes reference to certain 
other groups of persons. 
 
Different Member States have for a variety of differing reasons exempted certain groups of 
third country nationals from the visa requirement. These derogations from the visa 
requirements on a country-to-country basis are recorded in Annex 5 of the Visa Code 
Handbook. The groups of persons capable of being exempted from the visa requirement 
include politically significant persons such as holders of diplomatic passports and certain 
persons producing evidence signifying determined employment status. Asylum seekers, 
refugees and any mention to humanitarian purposes are omitted.  
 
Should the regulation grant wider exemption rights to individual Member States on the 
rights of e.g. asylum seekers to enter the territory of the issuing Member State without a 
visa, this could effectively have a similar effect to that of the humanitarian visa. The 
European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure frequently amend the Visa Regulation within the common policy on visas and 
other short-stay residence permits. It is not certain, however, whether or not Member 
States would actually endorse this proposal to include certain vulnerable groups of persons 
within those who can be exempted from the visa requirement. Considering their apparent 
reluctance with regard to the humanitarian visa, it would seem unlikely that the proposal 
would attract much support initially. Taking also into account the current trend of 
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underlining security aspects and rather than humanitarizing legislation the fact that 
legislation is aimed at tightening border controls171 this would suggest that attitudes are not 
exactly receptive to this idea.  
 
Nonetheless, similar effects as outlined above in relation to the VLTV would emerge in the 
context of visa exemptions. It goes without saying that the text of the article could not 
simply refer to ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘potential refugees’. This wording would undisputedly 
facilitate illegal migration at the expense of those truly in need of protection. Rather, the 
wording could refer to a double definition or permit system where the persons ‘earmarked’ 
as bona fide asylum seekers by the respective Member State or e.g. the UNHCR would be 
exempted from the visa requirement. This would obviously entail a similar initial decision 
on the merits of the individual case regarding the eligibility as in the case of the 
humanitarian visa. Furthermore, the embassy or other authority representing the exempting 
Member State present in the third country in question would have to issue some kind of 
proof of belonging to that group of persons referred to in Article 4 of the Visa Regulation 
that the person would need to produce to the border guard to entitle entry. This would in a 
sense merely replace the VLTV as a document that needed to be applied for and on which 
a decision was to be taken.  
 
 
6.2.2 Shared Border Crossing Points and Jurisdiction 
 
National laws as well as EU law and international law bind the border guard authorities of 
Member States. It is more often than not the case that an asylum seeker arrives irregularly 
to the border of a Member State to apply for asylum. This is precisely owing to the lack of 
legal means to gain access to the territory of the Member States. The regulation172 
amending, among others, the Schengen Borders Code, inserts into the latter a novel sort of 
border crossing point, the ‘shared border crossing point’. It means any border crossing 
point situated either on the territory of a Member State or on the territory of a third                                                         
171 See e.g. the safeguard clause as discussed above in chapter 3. 
172 Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Council Regulations (EC) No 1683/95 and (EC) No 
539/2001 and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Art. 1(1)(e).  
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country, at which Member State border guards and third country border guard carry out 
exit and entry checks one after another in accordance with their national law and pursuant 
to a bilateral agreement. Now with the possibility for EU Member States to establish 
according to the respective national laws and a bilateral agreement with the relevant third 
country a shared border crossing point, third country nationals, it is plausible, could 
potentially submit their asylum applications in the territory of a third country other than 
that of origin or failing that at least submit their visa applications.  
 
In simplicity, the shared border crossing point entails enabling the conveyance of the 
Member State border into the territory of a third country. An article173 requiring full 
compliance with relevant Union law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
relevant international law, including the Geneva Convention and other obligations related 
to access to international protection was also added to the Schengen Borders Code. Even 
without this latter amendment the concept of states’ responsibilities and jurisdiction vis-à-
vis access to asylum as embodied in international human rights law beyond the territorial 
borders of the state have been developed by various academics.174 Furthermore, pursuant 
to Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the right to asylum shall be guaranteed 
with due to respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention. The Charter is also emphatic in 
prohibiting the removal, expulsion or extradition of a person to a state where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
In addition to possibly being capable of applying for asylum outside the territory of the 
Member State, the third country nationals in question could apply for a VLTV at the 
shared border crossing point pursuant to Article 35 of the Visa Code, bearing in mind that 
the shared border crossing point constitutes an external border. External borders as 
understood by the Schengen acquis mean the Member States’ land borders, including river                                                         
173 Ibid, Art. 1(3): ‘The following Article is inserted:  
“Article 3a 
Fundamental Rights  
When applying this Regulation, Member States shall act in full compliance with relevant Union law, 
including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("the Charter of Fundamental Rights"); 
relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 
July 1951 ("the Geneva Convention"); obligations related to access to international protection, in particular 
the principle of non-refoulement; and fundamental rights. In accordance with the general principles of Union 
law, decisions under this Regulation shall be taken on an individual basis."’ 
174 On the concept of effective control see e.g. K. Touzenis, ‘Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law 
and the Globalisation of Migration Control’, 24 International Journal of Refugee Law 2 (2012), 501-504.  
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and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, 
provided that they are not internal borders175. A shared border crossing point situated 
physically on the territory of a third country can barely be fathomed as an internal border 
of the territory of the Member States. As is the case with regular visa applications, a visa 
applicant applying for a visa at the external borders can be issued a VLTV valid only for 
the territory of the issuing Member State. Same considerations regarding the discretion of 
issuing a VLTV as discussed above in chapter 5 apply to visas applied for at the external 
borders. The benefit of issuing VLTVs in such shared border crossing points would be that 
in the event of conflict that leads to the closing of an embassy or consulate, visa 
applications could nonetheless be processed in such an office should it remain operational 
during the conflict. This issue also opens up the debate whether or not asylum applications 
could be lodged at these shared border crossing points and how the principle of non-
refoulement, access to asylum and effective control would apply there.  
 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
As already discussed in chapter 2 and outlined above, Member States of the EU are bound 
by numerous norms regarding the protection of refugees and the right to asylum. The rights 
enshrined in the Charter apply to Member States when they are implementing EU law. It 
does not apply in cases where EU law is not involved176. The Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union defines the powers of the Union. By virtue of Article 78 of the TFEU 
the Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third country national requiring 
international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. 
This policy must be in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and other relevant 
treaties. Furthermore, the European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure can adopt measures for a common asylum system 
comprising a common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of 
a massive inflow177; criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is 
                                                        
175 Schengen Borders Code, Art. 2(2).  
176 However, the European Convention on Human Rights would apply. 
177 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 78(2)(c). 
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responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary protection178; and 
partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of 
people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection179. These competences 
read together with the essential articles of the Charter, the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
sources of EU law readily empower the Commission to take further action in making for 
better policies on border checks, asylum and immigration with a view to protect those 
fleeing persecution. Below are some recommendations for Member States and the 
Commission in promoting the general interest of the Union and overseeing the application 
of Union law. 
 
 
1. Issuance of Visas with Limited Territorial Validity 
 
 Member States and the Commission should: 
 
 1. Study in depth the possibilities and challenges regarding the issuance of 
 humanitarian visas at EU level and national institutions; 
 2. Start to gather disaggregated data on the grounds for issuing VLTVs;  
 3. Create a harmonised approach to VLTV-issuing practices when it comes  
 to the  discretion regarding the issuance of a humanitarian visas due to the current 
 lack of harmony with respect to Member State practices in VLTV-issuing; 
 4. Create a common system for determining who is eligible for a VLTV; 
 5. On a trial basis, start implementation of a harmonised approach to VLTV-issuing 
 practices and coordinate within Local Schengen Cooperation and through
 extensive representation networks in respective third countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
178 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 78(2)(e). 
179 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 78(2)(g).  
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2. Visa Exemptions 
 
Member States and the Commission should: 
 
 1. Consider and discuss in the Visa Working Party and in the European Parliament 
 the possibilities and methods for exempting from the visa requirement bona fide 
 third country nationals in need of protection (e.g. those identified by the UNHCR). 
 
 
3. Shared Border Crossing Points 
 
Member States should: 
 
 1. Assume jurisdiction and responsibility of border guards to receive asylum 
 applications and visa applications in the territory of third countries in accordance 
 with the Schengen Borders Code. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The study was set out to explore EU visa policy as a barrier to entry and how the concept 
of the humanitarian visa relates to the saving of lives of those in need of protection. The 
thesis outlined the legal norms regulating the responsibility of states to protect refugees 
and reviewed the current visa regime in place. The potential scope and role of visa policy 
as a preventive tool was considered. So, too, was the way in which media and politicians 
have reacted to the lack of legal means for asylum seekers to enter the Union. Legal 
instruments such as international treaties, Union legislation and policy documents along 
with statistics were analysed in order to establish the legal framework of the humanitarian 
visa as well as state practices with regard to the issuance thereof. The remainder of this 
study dealt with the recommendations regarding humanitarian visas as well as other means 
of facilitating the safe passage of asylum seekers into the Union together with the 
opportunities and challenges.   
 
The protection of those fleeing persecution is not a question of charity and benevolence. It 
is on the one hand a question of rights and on the other a question of responsibilities. 
Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. In 
spite of this unambiguous right guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights the right has failed to be entrenched in national laws that would entitle asylum 
seekers to cross the borders for the purpose of applying for safe haven. The right is 
ambitious and magnanimous in all its promise, yet it is illusory so long as it is not 
effectively bestowed upon those in need of protection, or in other words, so as long as 
those fleeing persecution cannot properly make use of this right apparently conferred upon 
them.  
 
In spite of the right to seek and enjoy asylum, various barriers to entry inhibit access to 
asylum. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the treaty bringing migration policy 
into the competence of the Union, a proliferation of border controls and restrictions on 
migration in Europe has taken place. These legal measures and actions adopted by the 
Commission and Member States contribute to the material barriers that desperate families 
face. Visa policy as currently exercised by the Member States and the Commission is 
exclusive by nature and indeed constitutes a barrier to entry along with carrier sanctions, 
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interceptions at sea and the employment of immigration liaison officer networks. Strict 
visa requirements for all major refugee-producing countries make it practically impossible 
for asylum seekers to enter the territory of the Union legally. In want of adequate legal 
means to gain access to asylum, those fleeing persecution often resort to irregular and 
clandestine means of crossing the border. This entails dangerous voyages across the seas in 
unseaworthy vessels, which as we unfortunately know, many a time lead to disastrous 
outcomes. While visa policy is stringent, the Visa Code nonetheless provides for a special 
type of visa that can be issued even if those strict requirements are not met. This so-called 
visa with limited territorial validity, or humanitarian visa, is most commonly valid only for 
the issuing Member State as opposed to a common Schengen visa, which is generally valid 
for all Member States.  
 
The issuance of the humanitarian visa is not yet harmonised at EU level and this has led to 
deviation between the practices of Member States. The extent of discretion handed down 
to Member States by the Visa Code in relation to issuing humanitarian visas is also 
unclear. It is nonetheless certain from the facts presented above that some Member States 
already make use of the visa with limited territorial validity and its potential as a 
humanitarian visa. Some leading politicians have even spoken out calling on the notion of 
the humanitarian visa to lower the toll of migrant deaths at the external borders of the 
Union. In the meanwhile, Member States are by and large wary of giving the proposal the 
green light.  
 
The current trend of visa policy instituted by policy-makers at the top level of the Union 
and individual Member States seems to lean toward enhancing security at the expense of 
human rights of asylum seekers. In the realm of security and migration, or national interest 
and human rights, there exist opposing views and contradictory premises, both formulated 
using the same language of security, human rights law and sovereignty. The only 
difference traces to the question of whose security and whose human rights. To advocate 
for an approach in migration and refugee policy making full use of the toolbox, including 
humanitarian visas, shared border crossing points and visa waivers for vulnerable persons, 
is perhaps premature without then accordingly adopting a sincerely comprehensive 
approach where far-reaching ramifications for national policies on asylum, naturalisation, 
integration, societal matters, welfare, employment issues and education, to mention but a 
few, are also considered and fitted together. For this purpose, the Commission and 
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Member States alike should take note and act. The concept of the humanitarian visa is 
certainly an idea worth exploring more and considering as part and parcel of the 
governmental response to the crisis at hand. Secondly, due to the non-disaggregation of 
currently issued visas with limited territorial validity, research on the frequency of VLTVs 
issued for humanitarian reasons and the appropriateness and feasibility of the VLTV to 
play the role of a harmonised humanitarian visa is potentially misleading. The Commission 
would do well in requiring that Member States provide disaggregated information on the 
grounds for which VLTVs have been issued in order to facilitate better and more accurate 
research. Nonetheless, current legislation provides for the issuance of the so-called 
humanitarian visa the use of which, as it would appear, is up to the discretion of each 
Member State.  
 
There is worth in realising the importance of history as well as the shortcomings typified 
by modern means of dealing with migratory matters at EU level, and how understanding 
them can release us from our intuition that how things are, is what is necessary. Current 
practices have proved time and again insufficient for the purpose of protecting human lives 
and managing the external borders of the Union. The endeavour for creating a brighter and 
safer future for asylum seekers may very well begin with the deconceptualisation of 
current truisms and definitions on security, asylum and societal capacities spurred up by 
populist politics from the right, left and centre. Some maintain that the time of great stories 
is over. How grand would it be should a life or two be saved at the hand of a consular 
officer processing a mundane affair such as a visa application? The precept of the 
humanitarian visa, both controversial and powerful, may yet come to embody a harbinger 
of hope for those in need of protection. Whether or not that message is heard, understood 
and realised will be the true test of this doctrine.  
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